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INTRODUCTION
In long-running debates over civil justice reform, two points
remain broadly shared: the legal regime for civil litigation in this
country is exceptional by comparison to European systems as a posi-
tive matter, and the United States is much the worse for it in norma-
tive terms. The positive dimension of this account pinpoints several
exceptional features of the U.S. civil justice system: class actions, pri-
marily on an opt-out basis; contingency-fee financing of litigation; re-
jection of Euro-style "loser-pays" rules that link responsibility for the
fees of both sides to the outcome of the litigation; extensive reliance on
juries as factfinders; costly pretrial discovery; and the availability of
punitive damages in substantial areas of civil litigation, such as torts.'
One normative implication drawn by some proponents of civil
justice reform, particularly as to tort litigation, is that the foregoing
features generate a considerable and undesirable drag on the U.S.
economy. 2 A related criticism posits that the civil justice system yields
a paltry ratio between the compensation actually received by claim-
ants and the expenses incurred by the legal system to deliver it. 3 Some
popular proponents even go so far as to suggest that much of the U.S.
civil justice landscape facilitates a kind of interest group rent-seeking
by the plaintiffs' bar, with the result of an "overlawyered" nation.4
1. Prominent arguments for civil justice reform in the general interest press highlight sev-
eral of these differences. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991) (review-
ing historical developments behind differences in American and European civil justice systems);
id. at 37 (contingency fees); id. at 56-66 (class actions); id. at 280 (punitive damages); id. at 334
(lack of loser-pays rule). Much the same litany appears in discussions of aggregate procedure in
Europe directed to the practicing bar. See, e.g., Laurel J. Harbour & Marc E. Shelley, The Emerg-
ing European Class Action: Expanding Multi-Party Litigation to a Shrinking World, PRAC.
LITIGATOR, July 2007, at 23, 23 (canvassing European developments in aggregate procedure).
2. See, e.g., TILLINGHAST, TOWERS PERRIN, 2006 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 3
(2006), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2006/
200611/Tort_2006_FINAL.pdf (estimating cost of U.S. tort system as $261 billion in 2005).
3. For a critical overview of research on the compensation ratio in the civil justice system,
see Charles Silver, Does Civil Litigation Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2075-81 (2002)
(discussing "shortcomings associated with efforts to use the compensation ratio.., as a norma-
tive standard when gauging the performance of litigation processes").
4. The name of the prominent legal blog site "Overlawyered" captures this view of the
plaintiffs' bar. See http://www.overlawyered.com ("[c]hronicling the high cost of our legal sys-
tem").
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Other observers share the positive description of American ex-
ceptionalism but see its implications quite differently. These observers
regard U.S.-style civil litigation as the regrettable byproduct of a deep
cultural hostility to the kind of robust bureaucratic administration by
public regulatory bodies embraced in Europe. 5 Versions of this second
view cast U.S.-style tort litigation, for instance, as an unwieldy substi-
tute for social insurance programs 6 and the plaintiffs' bar as a useful
form of privatized bureaucracy, at least in the absence of robust Euro-
style public administration.
7
Differences of prescription aside, however, the shared points
remain: the United States is indeed exceptional in matters of civil liti-
gation, and its exceptionalism is a bad thing. If only the United States
could get over its bugaboos, so the implication goes, then its policy-
makers would realize the wisdom of civil justice measures that would
be, in one way or another, more along the lines of their counterparts in
Europe.
This Article examines recent developments in aggregate civil
litigation across the Atlantic as a way to advance two points. The first
consists of a modest challenge to the familiar positive claim of Ameri-
can exceptionalism. The second and more important point counsels a
reorientation of the exceptionalism discussion to encompass not only
the comparing of rules, procedures, and practices but also, more
broadly, what one might label as the structural dynamics of aggregate
litigation. These structural dynamics, not so much the particular pro-
cedures that a given nation might embrace for aggregation, comprise
the real story of convergence likely to unfold in the coming decades.
The positive challenge is this: far from maintaining or increas-
ing their divergence from U.S. practices, European nations in recent
years have come to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize ag-
gregate litigation. By "aggregate litigation," I refer, in the manner of
the American Law Institute ("ALI") project on the subject, to litigation
that undertakes some manner of unified resolution with regard to re-
5. For a thoughtful statement of this view, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM
(2001).
6. One classic statement of this view remains STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH
PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989). On the historical connection between the emergence of modern
U.S. tort law and earlier, private versions of social insurance for industrial workers, see JOHN
FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC (2004).
7. See John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Le-
galism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 290-91 (2007) (conclud-
ing that the private tort bar has "created a massive private administration system with many of
the same attributes" as a public administration system).
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lated civil claims held by multiple persons.8 The term embraces proce-
dures in the nature of representative litigation, such as class actions.
In representative litigation, the vast majority of persons whose claims
are to be resolved are not formal parties to the action but, rather, are
represented by someone (or, perhaps, some organization) similarly si-
tuated. But "aggregate litigation" also embraces procedures for unified
resolution of multiple, related lawsuits, each nominally brought by a
different person with formal party status.
Looking across the European landscape, one can situate within
the broad rubric of "aggregate litigation" such differing procedures as
Dutch collective settlement actions,9 English group litigation orders, 10
German model cases in securities litigation," and Italian class ac-
tions,1 2 among other procedures.13 Additional moves in the offing sug-
gest a similar openness to possible reforms in the direction of more ra-
ther than less aggregate litigation. These include major studies by the
European Commission of new measures for aggregate redress in anti-
8. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 2, at
12, Nov. 18, 2008) ("All aggregate proceedings combine claims or defenses by many persons for
unified resolution, which may be by trial or settlement."). I serve as one of the Associate Report-
ers for this project.
9. Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code] [BW] arts. 3:305a-b; Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1,
at 28.
10. Civil Procedure Rules 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, Part 19, § III.
11. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [Act on the Initiation of Model Case Proceed-
ings in Respect of Investors in the Capital Markets], Aug. 16, 2005, BGB1. I at 2437, translated
at http://www.bmj.bund.de/kapmug.
12. CODICE DEL CONSUMO [C. CONSUMO] art. 140, translated at http://lawprofessors. type-
pad.com/masstortjlitigation/2008/01/italys-new-clas.html.
13. For an overview of the various European approaches to aggregate litigation, see Part
II.B infra (table of recent European developments in aggregate litigation); see also CHRISTOPHER
HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
51-92 (2008) [hereinafter HODGES, REFORM]; Christopher Hodges, Europeanisation of Civil Jus-
tice: Trends and Issues, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 96, 114-20 (2007) [hereinafter Hodges, Europeanisa-
tion]. In keeping with the European literature, infra note 14, I focus on aggregate litigation in
the context of damage claims against defendant businesses, the analogues to the sorts of anti-
trust, securities, tort, contract, and consumer claims familiar to U.S. class actions.
An important development in Europe beyond the scope of this Article consists of the emer-
gence of "pilot judgments" from the European Court of Human Rights, whereby that body uses
the first applicant before it as the procedural vehicle through which to address systematic viola-
tions of the European Convention on Human Rights by signatory nations. See Laurence R. Hel-
fer, Redesigning the ECHR: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Hu-
man Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 148, 154 (2008) (discussing development of "pilot
judgments" and first uses thereof). These pilot judgments have encompassed damage remedies
as well as non-monetary remedies against non-complying governments. See id. at 154 (noting
troubling possibility of first applicant settling for more favorable "individual damages award over
systematic non-monetary remedies"). On the potential significance of human rights litigation for
the development of class action law in the United States, see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Human
Rights Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United States Civil
Litigation System, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2211 (2004).
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trust and consumer litigation 14 and by the Civil Justice Council of
England and Wales on reform of collective redress. 15
The move toward greater receptiveness for aggregate litigation
in Europe predictably has prompted consternation from defense-side
practitioners,1 6 even while that development presents a potentially lu-
crative new venue for their legal services. A 2007 survey of business
executives and lawyers by the Intelligence Unit of The Economist re-
ports a widespread expectation that aggregate litigation along the
lines described here will become "prevalent" in Europe over the next
decade. 17 The notion of entrepreneurial opportunity certainly has not
been lost on U.S. plaintiffs' lawyers, with prominent class action firms
Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
& Hedges establishing London offices. ' These moves stand as market
evidence that meaningful change is in progress. Recognition of these
developments has formed the starting point for two significant trans-
Atlantic conferences in recent years: the first in December 2007, co-
sponsored by Stanford Law School and the Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies at Oxford University 19 and the second in June 2008, cospon-
14. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER ON DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR
BREACH OF THE EC ANTITRUST RULES 4 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commcompetitionantitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/whitepaper-en.pdf; JULES
STUYCK ET AL., THE STUDY CENTRE FOR CONSUMER LAw - CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
LAW, AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONSUMER REDRESS OTHER
THAN REDRESS THROUGH ORDINARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 12-13 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports-studies/comparative-report-en.pdf.
15. CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, "IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS": DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS: A SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 118-52 (2008), available at
http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/ImprovingAccess-toJusticethrough.Collective Acti
ons.pdf; see also RACHEL MULHERON, REFORM OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN ENGLAND AND WALES:
A PERSPECTIVE OF NEED 157-60 (2008), available at http://www.civiljusticecouncil.
gov.uk/files/collective-redress.pdf (concluding that "there is overwhelming evidence of the need
for a further collective redress mechanism").
16. See, e.g., JOHN H. BEISNER & CHARLES E. BORDEN, ON THE ROAD TO LITIGATION ABUSE:
THE CONTINUING EXPORT OF U.S. CLASS ACTION AND ANTITRUST LAW 20 (2006), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docId=1061 (warning of increasing
susceptibility in Europe to the "same litigation abuse crisis that has plagued the United States").
17. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COLLECTIVE LITIGATION IN EUROPE 7 (2007), available
at http://viewswire.eiu.com/report-dl.asp?mode=fi&fi=1383861523.PDF (finding "88% [of busi-
ness leaders surveyed] expect group litigation will become prevalent in the EU within the next
ten years.").
18. Brooke Masters, US Law Firm Makes Move on Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3,
2007, at 22; Kellie Schmitt, Quinn Emanuel Jumps at London Opportunity, RECORDER (S.F.),
Apr. 23, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1208947717234.
19. This event yielded detailed descriptions of aggregate litigation across twenty-seven na-
tions, including several outside of North America and Europe. See Conference, The Globalization
of Class Actions (2007), http://www.law.stanford.edu/calendar/details/1066/The Globalization of
Class Actions/#relatedinformation and recordings (listing the respective nations' reports on
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sored by New York University School of Law, the ALI, and the Euro-
pean University Institute.
The embrace of aggregate litigation in Europe in widely vary-
ing forms makes the U.S.-style class action less exceptional within the
Western world. As I shall elaborate, even this modest lessening in the
degree of American exceptionalism in the area of aggregate litigation
has had important implications for the capacity of class actions in U.S.
courts to encompass persons in Europe in the context of securities
class actions.
One must take care not to overstate the positive point, how-
ever. European receptiveness to new procedures for aggregate litiga-
tion, in one form or another, stops markedly short of full-fledged em-
brace for U.S.-style class actions, much less related features of
litigation finance. Even while counseling in favor of greater receptive-
ness for aggregate litigation as a vehicle for consumer redress, leaders
of the European Union ("EU") hasten to underscore their disinclina-
tion to import the "litigation culture" of the United States. 20 The jux-
taposition of these two sentiments, I argue, represents an effort to
embrace what one might call the potential of aggregate procedure to
achieve closure but without its potential to "enable" litigation. 21 Euro-
pean leaders, in short, seek to provide new vehicles to make peace in
the aggregate for related claims already in the civil justice system but
to avoid a litigation bonanza. As a result, the law is unlikely to see
anything like a trans-Atlantic convergence toward the specifics of
U.S.-style class actions along the lines of what some prominent schol-
ars have envisioned (controversially) as convergence toward U.S.-style
corporate governance centered on shareholder primacy.22 The global-
aggregate litigation). For an important precursor, see Symposium, Debates over Group Litigation
in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn from Each Other?, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
157 (2001).
20. See David Gow, Business Chiefs Attack Plan for US-Style Consumer Litigation,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 19, 2007, at 28 (quoting EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes); see also
Michael Peel, Class Action Lawsuits Could Take Root, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2007, at 4
(describing a" 'growing sense of alarm' in the European business community" and a "'consensus
that the US system is not what we want' ").
21. I draw here on terminology in the U.S. class action literature. See William B. Ruben-
stein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action,
74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710 (2006) (discussing how class actions can "enable" litigation and gen-
erate positive externalities for society); cf. Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective En-
forcement of Consumer Law: A Framework for Comparative Assessment, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L.
391, 401 (2008) (distinguishing between "adversarial and bargaining enforcement models" for
consumer litigation in Europe).
22. The leading account of the convergence hypothesis for corporate governance is Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
For assessments of this prediction, see CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
[Vol. 62:1:1
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ization of commerce, in other words, portends no grandiose "end of his-
tory" for the law of aggregate litigation.
23
The cataloguing of nuanced differences in aggregate procedure
across the United States and Europe is surely a useful start. But the
discussion thus far has proceeded with comparatively little in the way
of an overall analytical frame within which to set the particulars. 24 To
borrow roughly from evolutionary biology: the present state of discus-
sion is rather like a delineation of minute differences in the beaks of
Galapagos finches, but without Darwin's theory of the overarching
mechanism by which evolution occurs. 25 This Article offers something
considerably less than a theory to explain the evolution of life on
earth. My suggestion, nonetheless, is that there is a kind of evolution
afoot in aggregate litigation across the Atlantic, but its workings are
not well understood. This observation leads, in turn, to the second,
more significant claim of this Article.
Simply put, the structural dynamics of aggregate litigation
across the Atlantic will tend to recreate, to a considerable degree, the
difficulties seen in recent decades in the context of nationwide class
action litigation within the United States. The nationalization of
commerce in the United States during the twentieth century led to
aggregate litigation of a commensurately national scope. What fol-
lowed were efforts on the part of courts in one state to resolve on a
class-wide basis the claims of persons dispersed throughout the na-
tion. The goal was to expand the scope of aggregation in procedural
terms to match the scope of the underlying disputed activity, rather
than the jurisdictional sovereignty of the forum. At its extreme, this
process of "regulatory mismatch"26 between the forum for aggregate
23. Hansmann and Kraakman's article title alludes to the title of a then-contemporary sug-
gestion of convergence toward Western-style liberal democracy in the post-Cold-War era. See
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1996).
24. Significant exceptions in the European literature are the analytical frameworks devel-
oped in HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13; Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 21; and Hans-W. Mick-
litz, Collective Private Enforcement of Consumer Law: The Key Questions, in COLLECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW 11 (Willem van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007), though in
none of these instances by reference to the notions of regulatory mismatch and anomalous courts
featured here.
25. For discussion of the experiments demonstrating finch beak evolution and the central
conceptual role of natural selection to the understanding of such evolution, see generally
JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH (1994). I am grateful to Owen Jones for helpful dis-
cussion of the analogy drawn here.
26. The terminology here builds on the treatment of U.S. class action litigation in Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649,
1674-75 (2008). For discussion of mismatches between the forum for litigation and the source of
the governing substantive law in the context of federal-state relations more generally, see Sam-
uel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1415
(2006).
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litigation and its potential preclusive scope was no accident. Rather,
class counsel would select the state-court forum for such a class action
precisely for its anomalous features-paradigmatically, for its per-
ceived proclivity to certify a nationwide class action that the vast ma-
jority of other courts in the United States would not certify. The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") represents an indirect and par-
tial response in federal statutory law to this phenomenon.
Now, consider the economy of the twenty-first century, a time
when the scope of commerce is no longer national but increasingly
global. Then, add to the picture different procedural regimes for ag-
gregation in different courts that are the creatures not of the various
states within the United States but, rather, of the nation-states of the
West. 27 When coupled with this diversity of approaches to aggregate
litigation, the globalization of commerce has a considerable tendency
to invite a replication of regulatory mismatches-now, with interna-
tional proportions. Courts in one nation-state will seek to resolve
claims on the part of persons in others-perhaps, even worldwide-in
keeping with the scope of the disputed conduct. This structural dy-
namic, not so much the marked differences in the particulars of aggre-
gate litigation procedure, represents the real story of convergence to-
day.
True enough, U.S.-style class actions are likely to remain ex-
ceptional from a trans-Atlantic perspective. But the U.S. experience
with regulatory mismatches between state authority and the scope of
attempted claims resolution on an aggregate basis is likely to become
increasingly unexceptional at the level of nation-states. 28 In this light,
this Article analyzes both the Vivendi securities class action in the
United States and the pathbreaking Royal Dutch Shell settlement for
investors across Europe under the 2005 Dutch Collective Settlement
Act, situating the two examples in relationship to one another.
On this account, even the stated resistance to the "litigation
culture" of the United States on the part of European systems will
not-indeed, cannot-immunize Europe from the kinds of structural
dynamics exhibited by U.S.-style aggregate litigation. The combined
27. My attention to the distinction between the word "state" in the U.S. domestic sphere
and the same word in international law discourse stems from the U.S. constitutional literature
on state sovereign immunity. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism:
The Proper Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 819, 821 (1999) (discussing issues raised by the use of the word "state" in the constitutional
text).
28. For a similar argument concerning international trade under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization and interstate commerce in the early history of the United States, see John
0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REV. 511 (2000).
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effect here is rather like the expressed resistance in France toward
U.S.-style capitalism, coupled with the on-the-ground observation that
France is now among the strongest foreign markets for McDonald's
restaurants. 29 If anything, the structural dynamics of aggregate litiga-
tion have the potential to become even more difficult for the law to ad-
dress in a world of global commerce than in the U.S. setting.
The nationalization of commerce in the United States during
the twentieth century took place in tandem with considerable nation-
alization of formal governing authority. Whatever one might make of
its content, CAFA was possible only because a federal Congress ex-
isted to enact national law. By contrast, the globalization of commerce
and the consequent demands for the global resolution of claims take
place in the absence of a correspondingly global system of govern-
ance-at least, the absence of one with formal institutional status like
that of the United States. As a result, considerable pressure is likely
to build on one doctrinal feature that is the closest thing within the
present-day, trans-Atlantic world of civil litigation: the principles of
preclusion across nation-states or, in more technical terms, the law
governing the transnational recognition of judgments. Discussions of
aggregate litigation across the Atlantic should be as much about the
appropriate parameters for preclusion as they are now about the Ga-
lapagos finch particulars of different nation-states' procedural re-
gimes.
Even when Europe consciously seeks to avoid the U.S. experi-
ence-to harness the closure potential of aggregation, without its ena-
bling potential-developments in the United States loom large. One
lingering point of uncertainty in the U.S. law of class actions after the
Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
consists of the latitude available for so-called settlement classes-
aggregations solely for the purpose of peacemaking, with class counsel
"disarmed," in the Court's words, from threatening the defendant with
actual trial in the aggregate. 30 As I shall detail, the workings of the
Royal Dutch Shell settlement invite renewed attention-now, at the
transnational level-to when and how a lack of embrace for the ena-
bling potential of aggregation might undermine the legitimacy of ag-
gregate peacemaking. In doctrinal terms, the question of legitimacy
stands to play out as a question of the preclusive effect that the peace
arrangement properly may wield.
29. See Paul Betts, Sarkozy and Kerviel Chase a French-American Dream, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Feb. 2, 2008 (Asia ed.), at 7 ("France has become McDonald's' fastest-growing market.").
30. 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
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For that matter, one need not regard litigation as the sole, or
even the primary, mode for claims resolution in a globalized world.
One controversial development in U.S. aggregate litigation in recent
years has consisted of the prevalent use of contractual arbitration
clauses that channel disputes in consumer settings to private arbitra-
tion rather than civil litigation. 31 The move to substitute arbitration
for litigation is in keeping with larger trends by which contracting
parties might choose their desired legal regime. 32 The U.S. experience
suggests that, preclusion principles aside, private contracts might
seek to provide a degree of de facto global governance in civil justice,
though conceivably of a less transparent sort.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I lays out the under-
lying architecture of the argument, discussing the features that give
rise to the structural dynamics of aggregate litigation. Part II frames
the problem of regulatory mismatch between the rendering court and
the scope of preclusion on an aggregate basis, looking first at the U.S.
experience and then turning to recent developments that point toward
its replication in Europe with even greater difficulties. These devel-
opments include the efforts of aggregate litigation in U.S. courts to en-
compass persons across the Atlantic and the response that those ef-
forts have engendered in the design of civil procedure in Europe. Part
III then underscores the centrality of preclusion principles and private
contracting for discussions of aggregate litigation in Europe. Those
subjects-the content of which remains largely unsettled with respect
to European aggregate litigation-stand to have at least as much of a
real-world impact as the particulars of the procedures that a given na-
tion might adopt.
I. A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON AGGREGATE LITIGATION
The structural dynamics of aggregate litigation arise from the
relationship among three features: (1) the scope of the contested activ-
ity that is the subject of the litigation, (2) the desired scope of preclu-
sive effect for the judgment in the aggregate proceeding, and (3) the
territorial authority of the government that has constituted the court
31. For criticism, see Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005). On the broader trend toward
displacement of conventional civil procedure by provisions in private contracts, see Judith Res-
nik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); see also Cafaggi & Micklitz, su-
pra note 21, at 399-401, and accompanying text.
32. See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 3-16 (2009) (discussing the
emergence of a 'law market," whereby governing laws are chosen by private persons and firms
rather than mandated by nation-states).
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where the litigation takes place. With some imprecision, one might
summarize these three features, in colloquial terms, as posing the fol-
lowing series of questions: What is the aggregate litigation about?
Who is to be precluded thereby? And where is the litigation to take
place?
The scope of the contested activity provides the most straight-
forward point of entry into a discussion of aggregate litigation across
the Atlantic. The simple point here is that much economic activity to-
day transcends the territorial boundaries of individual nations. Com-
merce is no longer national or regional but, rather, global. In particu-
lar, global commerce often involves commodities that are
undifferentiated in practical terms, either because they literally are
the same regardless of the nation in which the ultimate consumer re-
sides or because they are only nominally or modestly differentiated-
say, in the manner of equity interests in a global firm bought and sold
on different securities markets. On this view, it comes as no surprise
that the perceived need for fresh thinking in Europe about avenues
"other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings" should
have arisen in such settings as consumer and antitrust law, both of
which concern the marketing of goods and services that are more or
less uniform.33 The transnational marketing of undifferentiated com-
modities broadens the scope of adverse effects, whether of a defectively
designed consumer product, a price-fixing conspiracy among busi-
nesses, or a fraudulent misstatement about the financial posture of a
publicly traded firm.
The desired scope of preclusion in aggregate litigation has a
tendency to assume a scope commensurate with the underlying activ-
ity in question. One can see this point most easily by regarding aggre-
gate procedure as a vehicle for comprehensive resolution of the under-
lying dispute. From the standpoint of the settling defendant,
comprehensive peace means putting the dispute behind it, such that
the defendant may refocus its attention on its usual activities. The
sorts of businesses that conduct activity on an international level gen-
erally do not see themselves as being in the business of litigation, after
all. For such defendants, comprehensive peace holds the promise of
both reducing the transaction costs associated with ongoing litigation
and improving the financial posture of the business itself-chiefly, by
removing the litigation uncertainties that otherwise discourage capital
33. The quoted language comes from the title of STUYCK ET AL., supra note 14.
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market support for the firm.34 Thus, even in the United States, where
defense-side criticism of class actions is commonplace, defendants in a
settlement posture routinely prefer a class definition that is as broad
as possible in order to maximize the preclusive effect of the desired
deal.3
5
The tendency for the scope of preclusion to track the scope of
the underlying activity at issue in the litigation also can extend to ag-
gregation in the face of resistance from the defendant. The connection
in that setting may be less robust, however, depending on the finan-
cial arrangements on the claimants' side. For U.S. class actions, class
counsel tend to prefer a class definition that is as broadly encompass-
ing as possible. Broadly defined classes increase the pressure on the
defendant to settle36 and enable class counsel to assert control of the
litigation vis-A-vis would-be rivals within the plaintiffs' bar who oth-
erwise might represent claimants, whether individually or on some
aggregate basis.3 7
Disputed activity on a transnational scale plus demands for
preclusive effect commensurate with the scope of that activity, to-
gether, place tremendous pressure on the remaining feature of the
landscape for aggregate litigation: the scope of authority wielded by
the government within which the rendering court operates. The court
is an institution of the state, whether in the sense of U.S.-style feder-
alism or in the parlance of international law for nation-states. In this
respect, all courts are the creatures of "some definite authority."38
And, still today, states have a territorial connection in the sense that,
at least as a first-cut notion, they are supposed to govern within their
respective territories but not without.39 Aggregate litigation is simply
34. This generalizes an observation made in a significant area of aggregate litigation-mass
torts-permeated by the drive toward broadly encompassing settlements in one form or another.
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT x-xi (2007).
35. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1349-50 (1995) (arguing that class actions are "increasingly becoming a
shield for defendants").
36. The descriptive observation that aggregation increases settlement pressure by increas-
ing the variance of the litigation and, often, the absolute number of claims pending against the
defendant is entirely separate from the normative question whether such pressure is desirable or
undesirable.
37. The effect that features like the loser-pays rule might have on this preference remains a
question as yet unexplored, no doubt due largely to the recentness of interest in aggregate litiga-
tion from European systems that embrace the rule.
38. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. In Pennoyer u. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Supreme Court embraced this notion as the
centerpiece of its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for the nineteenth-century United States,
emphasizing that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial lim-
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a matter of the state governing its own affairs when the scope of the
underlying activity, the scope of preclusion, and the territorial author-
ity of the rendering court operate in synchronization. In short, aggre-
gate litigation in which states "mind their own business" is unlikely to
prompt controversy. The problem comes when the three structural
features of aggregate litigation go out of synchronization with one an-
other-when there is a regulatory mismatch among them, in other
words.
In our world, no formal political state has authority of a scope
commensurate with modern global business. As a result, our world is
one that virtually invites regulatory mismatches. The underlying dis-
pute is likely to be global, as might well be the desired preclusive
scope for litigation. But aggregate litigation necessarily must proceed
in some court within some government whose territorial authority
stops considerably short of the entire globe. When the underlying ac-
tivity transcends state boundaries, it may be possible procedurally to
limit the resulting judgment to the territorial boundaries of the state
that has constituted the rendering court.40 But one or the other side in
the litigation-quite possibly, both-might well regard such a limita-
tion as undesirable in practical terms for the reasons suggested ear-
lier. The desired preclusive effect of the judgment in the aggregate
proceeding then would expand so as to be commensurate with the
scope of the underlying dispute. The resulting structural dynamics in
aggregate litigation occupy the next Part.
its of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720. The advent of long-arm statutes compli-
cated this picture in the twentieth-century, enabling the courts of a given state in ordinary, one-
on-one litigation to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state citizens. See, e.g., SUZANNA
SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, ESSENTIALS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 238-39 (2007) (discussing the shift
from the territorial conception of Pennoyer to the focus on "minimum contacts" of the defendant
with the forum state in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
It is commonplace, moreover, for courts constituted by a particular sovereign to apply the
substantive law of another-often, a superior-sovereign. State courts do this with regularity
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. In addition, the Supreme Court has long
grappled with questions concerning the extraterritorial application of particular U.S. statutes
and, in that setting, has noted the need to "construeo ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations." F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empa.
gran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (analyzing extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act).
40. A recent $200 million antitrust settlement by British Airways and Virgin Atlantic re-
garding alleged collusion to set fuel surcharges resolves the claims of ticket purchasers in the
United States by way of an opt-out class action in a U.S. court and the claims of purchasers in
the United Kingdom via an opt-in procedure there. Airlines Settle U.K., U.S. Suits; International
Lawyers Call Class Action a First for Britain, 9 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 157 (Feb. 22,
2008).
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II. REGULATORY MISMATCHES AND THEIR STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS
With the problem of regulatory mismatches now in mind, this
Part sketches its implications, initially within the United States and
increasingly across the Atlantic. The U.S. setting raises at least the
possibility of formal governing authority that is of a scope commensu-
rate with the scope of commerce for much of the nation's history.
There is, after all, a national government for the United States. Even
so, as Section A notes, nationwide commerce and resulting nationwide
aggregate litigation still have proven difficult to address. Section B
explains that the trans-Atlantic domain magnifies these problems due
to the relative paucity of formalized means for litigation governance
that are commensurately trans-Atlantic in their reach. Here, oddly
enough, the potential for class actions in U.S. courts to encompass Eu-
ropean claimants has unleashed a dynamic that pushes in the direc-
tion of recognition for aggregate litigation in some form by European
nations. Yet, as I shall explain, recognition of this dynamic actually
increases the likelihood of mismatches between rendering U.S. courts
in class actions and European claimants.
A. Mismatches Within the United States
The scholarly literature on class actions ably catalogues the
problems of regulatory mismatch that have arisen in the United
States in recent decades, enabling me to compress the discussion
here.41 The starting point for the discussion builds on the treatment in
Part I of the relationship between the scope of the underlying dispute
and the court that serves as the forum for aggregate litigation. When
the disputed activity extends nationwide, the potential fora for a class
action on that subject extend similarly, across both federal and state
courts. The procedural rules for aggregation track the governmental
regime within which the court operates. So, for example, as to a class
action in Illinois state court, Illinois's class action rule applies, not
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One simplifying fea-
ture of the U.S. landscape, however, consists of a relative lack of sig-
nificant variation in class action rules among the federal courts (all of
which apply Rule 23) and state courts (which generally use rules that
either mimic Rule 23 or track its basic requirements). 42 The Supreme
41. See supra note 26 (citing to works on regulatory mismatch).
42. The procedural rules of two states-Mississippi and Virginia-do not authorize class
actions. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences
from - and Lessons for? - Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 147, 148 (2007).
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Court has made clear, moreover, that the most commonly used form of
class action in the U.S. setting-an opt-out class action under Rule
23(b)(3) or a counterpart state rule-may encompass absent class
members who lack the kinds of "minimum contacts" with the forum
otherwise required for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant.43 The result is to make possible within the U.S. domestic
sphere precisely the kind of mismatches described in Part I: a class ac-
tion in, say, Illinois state court that would resolve the claims of per-
sons nationwide, most of whom otherwise lack a substantial connec-
tion with that state.
The relative similarity in class action rules across the United
States, however, does not assure uniformity of application. The con-
tent of the rules themselves-particularly, the requirement in Rule
23(b)(3) that common questions "predominate" over individual ones-
entails a substantial degree of judicial discretion in application.
44
Class actions that involve claims under state rather than federal sub-
stantive law-tort or contract claims, for instance-add a further layer
of discretion to the predominance inquiry in the form of choice-of-law
principles that may call for multi-factor judicial balancing.45 The up-
shot is to focus attention on which court stands to wield discretion in
the application of broadly shared class action rules.
The disinclination of a court in one judicial system to certify a
nationwide class action under its rules is unlikely to exert issue-
preclusive effect over an effort to certify an identically composed na-
tionwide class in the court of a different judicial system, even when
the class action rule in the second court is identical textually to that in
43. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-12 (1985) (grounding this hold-
ing on differences between absent class members and out-of-state defendants).
44. See Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability'" A New Approach to Regulat-
ing Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1005-06 (2005) (characterizing the predominance test
as "rel[ying] on a subjective comparison of inherently incomparable factors").
45. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 32, at 45:
[The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] manages to stay young for-
ever by saying nothing and everything at once by accommodating all of the
judicial approaches to choice of law. Although the Second Restatement pro-
vides presumptive rules, which are favored by more traditional judges, courts
can ignore those rules any time in favor of a multifactored analysis, which
may indicate that a different state's law should apply. The multifactored
analysis takes into account virtually every consideration that courts have ex-
amined when choosing governing law. As a result, courts can use the Second
Restatement to justify any result they want to reach. This is great for courts,
but obviously not for people seeking guidance as to what legal rules govern
their conduct.
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the first. Rather, the second court generally retains discretion to in-
terpret differently its own class action rule.46
Now, consider the strategic implication of the preceding point
for nationwide class actions brought in federal court or the various
state courts across the country. If, at first, class counsel do not succeed
on the class certification question, then they generally may try, try
again in different courts. The nature of the class certification ruling is
such that, in the words of one prominent federal judge:
A single positive trumps all the negatives. Even if just one judge in ten believes that a
nationwide class is lawful, then if the plaintiffs file in ten different states the probability
that at least one will certify a nationwide class is 65% (0.910 = 0.349). Filing in 20 states
produces an 88% probability of national class certification (0.920 = 0.122).
4 7
The recent Class Action Fairness Act alters the choice of forum
for nationwide class actions involving state-law claims as an indirect
and partial response to the problem of the anomalous certifying court.
CAFA makes it much easier for a defendant that wishes to resist the
certification of such a class action to remove it from state to federal
court. 48 The indirection of this approach lies in the expectation of
CAFA proponents that a change in the court positioned to exercise
discretion on the class certification inquiry would make for a differ-
ence in result.49 To be sure, not every federal judge will rule the same
way on every contested class certification question. The implicit expec-
tation nonetheless is that the variance in result among federal
judges-all of whom are appointed rather than elected, unlike many of
their state-court counterparts 50-will be less than that among state-
court judges.
46. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d
133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[O]ur construction of Rule 23 and application to the provisional settle-
ment class is not controlling on the Louisiana court, because it is not bound by our interpretation
of Rule 23."); J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that "the wide discretion inherent in the decision as to whether or not to certify a class dic-
tates that each court-or at least each jurisdiction-be free to make its own determination in
this regard"). But see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
763-69 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding federal court decertification of nationwide class action to be issue
preclusive as to efforts to obtain certification of same nationwide class in state court).
47. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766-67 (Easterbrook, J.).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2000) (conferring federal diversity jurisdiction over class ac-
tions with more than $5 million in controversy and minimal diversity of citizenship).
49. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 22-27 (2005) (suggesting that federal courts are less inclined
toward certification of nationwide class actions); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction
and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2037 (2008)
("The shift to the federal forum ... is expected and intended to alter the outcome in class litiga-
tion based on state law.").
50. See Michael Richard Diminio, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges' Political
Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 54 n.1 (2006) ("Judges in thirty-nine states, comprising eighty-seven
percent of all judges in the United States, are elected.").
[Vol. 62:1:1
2009] AGGREGATE LITIGATION ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 17
Through removal to federal court, defendants effectively may
put the anomalous certifying state court out of the class certification
business-at least, when defendants so prefer. The scope of the under-
lying dispute, the scope of preclusion, and the territorial authority of
the government that has constituted the rendering court would all be
national. CAFA remains only a partial response to regulatory mis-
matches, however, for the legislation leaves the power of removal
where it usually lies: at the option of the defendant. The result is to
leave open the possibility that a defendant might prefer the anoma-
lous certifying state court to lend nationwide preclusive effect to a
class settlement negotiated by the defendant and class counsel. 51 In
the extreme, such a class settlement would perpetuate a phenomenon
observed prior to CAFA, whereby the defendant in search of a deal on
desirable terms could play off competing law firms within the class-
action plaintiffs' bar in what observers dub a "reverse auction."52 The
classic denouement consists of an approving judgment from a state
court situated in the locale of collaborating class counsel. Mismatches
might be perfectly desirable from the standpoint of defendants, in oth-
er words, when they afford nationwide preclusive effect to settlement
terms that undervalue the claims of class members.
The potential for mismatches as to both contested class certifi-
cations and collusive class settlements is well understood in the U.S.
class action literature, but a further problem is less readily grasped.
Considerable debate continues to rage in U.S. law over the parameters
for collateral attacks on the preclusive effect of class settlements. In
their typical form, these collateral attacks involve new litigation by
absent members of the class in a judicial system different from the one
that blessed the class settlement. The defendant seeks to interpose the
affirmative defense of claim preclusion, which the plaintiff attempts to
defeat by alleging a defect of federal constitutional due process-
usually, a lack of adequate class representation-in the judgment that
approved the class settlement. As Part III shall elaborate, the ferment
over collateral attacks in the U.S. context holds important lessons for
preclusion in the transnational setting. For present purposes, the im-
portant point is that collateral attacks form an avenue for mismatches
to reemerge-now, in the form of the court inclined to bust the na-
51. See Wolff, supra note 49, at 2041-42 (noting defendants' disinclination to remove when
they wish to use the more permissive state court to "bind the entire class to a bargain-basement
settlement").
52. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1354 (describing a reverse auction as a process "with the
low bidder among the plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to settle with the defendant").
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tional deal, rather than to bless it, in the name of an anomalous con-
ception of adequacy in class representation. 53
Here, yet again, the nationwide scope of the underlying class
action brings into play the various courts within the United States
from which rivals to class counsel may choose the forum for a collat-
eral attack. To be sure, collateral attacks might not exhibit quite the
potential for a "single positive" ruling of inadequate class representa-
tion to "trump all the negatives" in the manner of contested nation-
wide class certifications.5 4 And the potential for mismatches also de-
creases, insofar as collateral attack plaintiffs exhibit a tendency to sue
on their home turf. Still, the strategic implications of collateral attacks
can be far from trivial. By busting the deal, at least in part, rivals to
class counsel might manage to force the defendant into another round
of dealmaking-this time, with the rival law firm positioned to garner
a portion of the joint gains from resolution of tle underlying litigation,
something from which they would have been excluded under the origi-
nal deal fashioned by class counsel. In this sense, collateral attacks
might raise the familiar problem in economics whereby the lone hold-
out with regard to a transaction seeks to extract rents from the joint
gains that the deal would generate for those who put it together.
55
Procedural law at the national level injects a fair degree of reg-
ulation into the collateral attack process. When the court that ap-
proved the class settlement is a federal court, that court-not a poten-
tially anomalous one in a state judicial system-effectively evaluates
the preclusive effect of its own judgment by ruling on a motion to en-
join collateral litigation under the federal Anti-Injunction Act. 56 But
when the rendering court is a state court, that court has essentially no
authority to enjoin collateral attacks on its judgments in other judicial
systems. The preclusive effect of a state-court class action judgment,
instead, is a matter for other courts to evaluate under principles of
53. For further discussion of this problem and the conflicting secondary literature on collat-
eral attacks, see Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 26, at 1668-69.
54. One scenario to "trump all the negatives" would consist of a successful collateral attack
via a second class action, the members of which consist of the same persons said to have been
inadequately represented in the initial class action.
55. The prospect of such an impasse in bargaining provides the conventional economic justi-
fication for governmental powers of eminent domain in property law, for example. See STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 (2004).
56. The Act generally prohibits federal court injunctions of state court proceedings, but an
important exception to this stricture permits such injunctions "to protect or effectuate" a federal
court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
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"full faith and credit. ' 57 And, a difference in the court that rules on
preclusion in the posture of a collateral attack has the potential to
drive a difference in result. Proponents of collateral attacks-
particularly, such attacks as vehicles for rivalry within the plaintiffs'
bar over control of the underlying litigation-understandably will tend
to select a forum that maximizes their chances of success.
The overarching point from the U.S. setting is this: court sys-
tems with the capacity to resolve in the aggregate the claims of per-
sons outside the territorial boundaries of the governments in which
those courts operate are prone to a particular strategic dynamic. They
have a considerable potential to give rise to regulatory mismatches. At
its extreme, in the U.S experience, a state court-quite possibly, an
anomalous one as to class certification or class settlement approval-
effectively may govern the nation. The further prospect of a collateral
attack on the judgment rendered in an aggregate proceeding injects
additional potential for an anomalous court to reenter the picture. The
law may chasten these tendencies, in part, insofar as some political
authority of a scope commensurate with the scope of the underlying
dispute actually exists and chooses to intervene. In the U.S. setting,
such authority exists in the form of CAFA and the Anti-Injunction Act,
both of which are creatures of federal, rather than state, law. The next
Section takes these observations about structural dynamics within the
United States and translates them into the setting of nation-states on
both sides of the Atlantic.
B. Mismatches Go Transnational
One simplifying feature of the U.S. landscape consists of the
lack of dramatic variations, for the most part, in the procedural rules
for class actions. The same feature does not obtain at the trans-
Atlantic level. As Subsection B. 1 observes, the increased receptiveness
to aggregate litigation in Europe offers a modest corrective to depic-
tions of rampant American exceptionalism in civil justice. In broad-
brush terms, the United States and Europe have grown more similar
rather than less as to aggregate litigation. Still, U.S.-style class ac-
tions and the constellation of rules and practices within which they
operate remain significantly different from the face of aggregate litiga-
tion in Europe today.
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (establishing the obligation of states to accord "full faith and
credit" to the judgments of courts in other states); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (establishing the same obli-
gation of federal courts to accord "full faith and credit" to state-court judgments).
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Subsection B.2 traces the emergence in recent years of regula-
tory mismatches in the trans-Atlantic context that are analogous to
those seen in the U.S. setting. The leading edge for these mismatches
has come in the form of securities class actions in U.S. courts in which
the plaintiff class members consist overwhelmingly of European
shareholders. These securities class actions are the trans-Atlantic
counterparts to the phenomenon of state courts within the United
States effectively seeking to govern the resolution of claims nation-
wide. It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to see this phenomenon as
merely the product of overreaching judges. Rather, the structural dy-
namics of mismatches situate lawyers in the role of prime movers and
judges in a more reactive mode. Subsection B.2 analyzes the curious
dynamic to which the recent phenomenon of trans-Atlantic mis-
matches has contributed, integrating the discussion of aggregate liti-
gation in Europe with an account of lawyering and competition within
the plaintiffs' bar. When the scope of that competition has taken on a
trans-Atlantic dimension, it should not surprise us that dynamics like
the ones seen within the United States have begun to emerge transna-
tionally.
1. Comparative Procedure
The existing literature catalogues the specifics of the various
regimes for aggregate litigation in one form or another across Eu-
rope.58 My goal here is not to replicate the comprehensiveness of those
treatments but, rather, to highlight the big-picture points that
emerge. Perhaps the biggest of all is that the exceptionalism of U.S.-
style class actions within the realm of aggregate litigation is not as
pronounced today as in decades past. To a degree, this observation is
the byproduct of terminology cast at a bird's-eye level. The term "ag-
gregate litigation" creates a big tent, within which one may place both
representative litigation for claimants as a collective group and con-
solidated litigation whereby each claimant's suit has a nominally
separate existence.5 9 The term likewise embraces both kinds of default
rules-opt-in or opt-out-that a given procedural system might use to
58. See, e.g., HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 51-92 (analyzing court rules in Europe for
multiple claims); STUYCK ET AL., supra note 14, at 260-322 (detailing report's findings with re-
spect to collective actions); Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 23-33 (describing emerging pro-
cedures for aggregate litigation in Europe); Hodges, Europeanisation, supra note 13, at 114-20
(analyzing "European trends in relation to multi-party representation mechanisms").
59. For further comparison of class actions and consolidations, see Charles Silver, Compar-
ing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495 (1991). For a helpful overview of the
widely varying European terminology for what I describe here as "aggregate litigation," see
HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 2-3.
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ascertain who is encompassed in an aggregate proceeding. In addition,
the term carves out aggregation from the array of surrounding rules
and practices-those concerning permissible means of litigation fi-
nance, rules for fee allocation, and latitude available for discovery,
among other topics-that stand to affect dramatically the real-world
impact of any manner of aggregate procedure. Still, the new configura-
tion of the forest today is striking, for all the remaining variations in
the trees. There simply is a less dramatic difference in aggregate liti-
gation across the Atlantic today than in times past, as the following
table reflects:




Denmark: "Danish 200761 Class certification requires, inter
Class Action Act ' 60  alia, common claims, procedural
superiority, adequate notice and
representation6
2
Class representatives may be in-
dividual plaintiffs, public bodies,
or private associations
63
Opt-in or opt-out procedure, at
judge's discretion 64
Opt-out proceedings appropriate
if unmarketable claims 65
Only public bodies may serve as
class representatives in opt-out
proceedings
66
Class members may be required
60. See ERIK WERLAUFF, CLASS ACTIONS IN DENMARK-FROM 2008 2 (2007),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/Demark-Legislation.pdf (cit-
ing Administration of Justice Act § 254); Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 30-31 (discussing
the Danish Class Action Act).
61. See Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 30-31 (reporting effective date of Act as Janu-
ary 1, 2008).
62. Id.
63. WERLAUF, supra note 60, at 3.
64. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 31.
65. See WERLAUF, supra note 60, at 5 (stating that opt-out proceedings may be used when
"the claims cannot be expected to be made in individual actions because of their small size").
66. Id. at 3.








to provide security for opposing
parties' costs
67
Private claims that "give rise to
common or related issues of fact
or law" managed together in
same court
70
Not representative litigation, but
may employ test cases and lead
solicitors
71






No formal judicial oversight of
settlements
75
Finland: "Group Ac- 200777 Applies only to consumer cases
78
tions' '76  Government-funded "Consumer
Ombudsman" is only party per-




68. Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, pt. 19, § III (U.K.); HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at
295-97; CHRISTOPHER HODGES, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS PROJECT COUNTRY REPORT: ENGLAND
AND WALES 3 (2007), http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/eventsmedia
/EnglandLegislation.pdf [hereinafter HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES]; Harbour & Shelley, supra
note 1, at 28-29.
69. HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 68, at 3.
70. Id. at 10 (quoting Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, pt. 19.10 (U.K.)).
71. Id. at 2, 10.
72. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 29.
73. HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 68, at 10. For a recent proposal to move to
an opt-out procedure in England, see Mulheron, supra note 15, at 157-61; see also Rachael Mul-
heron, Justice Enhanced: Framing an Opt-Out Class Action for England, 70 MOD. L. REV. 550,
579 (2007) (contending that "the omission of an opt-out regime from English civil procedure is a
failure of immense proportions").
74. HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 68, at 19.
75. Id. at 25.
76. See HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 285-90 (translating Ryhmakannelaki 444/2007
[Act on Class Actions]); see also Mikko Valimaki, Introducing Class Actions in Finland - An Ex-
ample of Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis 1 (Working Paper Series, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261623.
77. HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 285.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 286.
80. Id. at 287.
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France: "Actions Tak- Mid- Authorized associations may
en in a Collective In- 1990s 82  bring actions "in the collective
terest"8 1  interest" in such areas as con-
sumer contracts, health care, en-
vironmental protection, and fi-
nancial investment
8 3
France: "Joint Repre- 199285 Authorized associations may sue
sentative Actions"8 4  for damages on behalf of con-
sumers or investors with injuries
of "common origin"
8 6
Action may be brought only if
two or more individuals author-
ize an association to sue in their
name
8 7
Applicable in such areas as




Germany: "Capital 200591 Common issues of law or fact
Markets Test Case tried in model proceeding
92
Act"90  Applies to claims for damages
81. See VERONIQUE MAGNIER, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION, PROTOCOL FOR NATIONAL REPORTERS, FRANCE 5, 7 (2007),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/France-National-Report.pdf
(citing Article L. 421 of the Consumer Code; Article L. 1114-2 of the Public Health Code; Article
L. 142-2 of the Environmental Code). For English translations of these Code provisions, see
HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 251-53.
82. MAGNIER, supra note 81, at 6.
83. Id. at 6-8.
84. See id. at 8 (citing Article L. 422-1 of the Consumer Code; Article 452-2, al. 1 of the
Monetary and Financial Code).
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 8-9.
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 12-13.
90. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [Act on the Initiation of Model Case Proceed-
ings in Respect of Investors in the Capital Markets], FED. LAW GAZETTE (Germany), Aug. 19,
2005, at 2437, translated at http://www.bmj.bund.delkapmug; see also HODGES, REFORM, supra
note 13, at 299-310; DIETMAR BAETGE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION - GERMANY 7 (2007), http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/ dy-
namic/events media/GermanyNationalReport.pdf; Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 29.
91. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 29.
92. Id.
93. BAETGE, supra note 90, at 13.
94. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 29.
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arising from "false, misleading,





Acts only on existing claims
95
Damages determined for each
individual case, drawing upon
model decision
96
Settlement requires consent of
all claimants
97
Italy: "Class Action 200799 Grants qualified organizations
Law"'98  authority to sue in such areas as
tort, antitrust, and unfair
tradeO00
Parties select "conciliation com-
mittee" consisting of one attor-
ney selected by plaintiff organi-
zation, one selected by
defendant, and one selected by
the chief judge10 1
The Netherlands: 2005103 Allows representative organiza-
"Collective Settle- tions to obtain binding settle-
ment of Mass Dam- ments in, for example, securities
ages Claims"10 2  litigation'
0 4
Opt-out procedure' 0 5
95. See BAETGE, supra note 90, at 15 ("Model Proceedings under the Capital Markets Model
Case Act start with the application to the State District Court, where the case is pending, for the
establishment of a model case procedure.").
96. See id. at 24 ("It is... up to the trial court to award monetary compensation to each in-
dividual plaintiff, based on the outcome of the model proceedings.").
97. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 1, at 29.
















2008107 Class certification requires, inter
alia, common issues of law or
fact, procedural superiority, and
adequate representation
l 0s
May be initiated by individual
plaintiffs, authorized public bod-
ies, or qualified private organiza-
tions 0 9
Opt-in or opt-out procedure, at
judge's discretion11 °
Opt-out proceedings appropriate
if unmarketable claims1 11
Sweden: "Swedish 2002113 Allows for class actions in such
Group Proceedings areas as consumer and environ-
Act"11 2  mental law
14





Prerequisites for class treatment
include common questions of fact
and procedural superiority
1 17
106. CAMILLA BERNT-HAMRE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION IN THE NORWEGIAN COURTS 2, 4 (2007), http://www.law.stanford.
edu/display/images/dynasmic/events mediafNorwayNationalReport.pdf (citing LOV-2005-06-
17-90, Act Relating to Mediation and Procedure in Civil Disputes, 17 June 2005 no. 90); Harbour
& Shelley, supra note 1, at 27.
107. BERNT-HAMRE, supra note 106, at 4.
108. See id. at 11 (explaining that, to bring a class action, "several legal persons must have
claims or obligations, which have identical or substantially similar factual and legal basis,"
courts must be able to hear claims with the "same composition and mainly pursuant to the same
procedural rules," and "it must be possible to nominate a class representative").
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 15.
111. See id. (explaining that opting out is availing "[i]f the individual claims 'on their own
involve amounts and interests that are so small that it must be assumed that a considerable ma-
jority of them would not be brought as individual actions' " (quoting The Dispute Act, section 35-
7(1))).
112. See HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 263-75 (translating SFS 2002:599 [Group Pro-
ceedings Act]).
113. Id. at 263.





a. Aggregation and Commerce
Timing is revealing here. In Europe, attention to the possibility
of aggregate litigation in some form is a phenomenon largely of the
past fifteen years or so. This is not to deny the existence of deeper his-
torical themes. The lineage of U.S.-style class actions extends back to
medieval group litigation in Europe, 118 and contemporary develop-
ments in Europe draw on that same history. Still, one cannot help but
notice the number of reforms across Europe in the direction of aggre-
gate litigation during the 1990s and thereafter.
In keeping with the analysis in Part I, the scope of commerce
may well be contributing substantially to European interest in aggre-
gate litigation. In fact, officials of the European Union explicitly link
their interest in the subject to the integration of the European mar-
ket.119 To note this linkage is not to suggest that markets somehow de-
termine the destiny of aggregate litigation. It is simply to recognize
the similarity between the European situation today and the context
in which U.S.-style class actions took hold in the 1966 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By the 1960s, the national highway system in the post-World-
War-II period had added to the integration of the U.S. economy al-
ready well under way from the age of railroads. 120 Today, European
economic integration extends beyond obvious features, such as a com-
mon currency, to the harmonization of substantive law in areas famil-
iar to aggregate litigation in the United States. As two commentators
observe:
The vast majority of substantive consumer law in the member states of the European
Union nowadays is of European origin, varying from legislation on consumer health and
safety, including the regulation of foodstuffs .... insurance law, product liability, unfair
contract terms, unfair commercial practices, distance selling of goods and services, dis-
tance marketing of financial services and consumer sales and consumer guarantees.
12 1
118. For a thorough history of U.S.-style class actions, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
119. See, e.g., George Parker, Class Actions Sought to Shield Shoppers, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 5, 2007, at 8 ("[1]f consumers are to have sufficient confidence in shopping outside their own
member state and take advantage of the internal market, they need assurance that if things go
wrong they have effective mechanisms to seek redress." (quoting Meglena Kuneva, EU Consumer
Affairs Commissioner)).
120. For a more extensive commentary on the contribution of interstate transportation to the
integration of the U.S. economy, see MARK H. ROSE, BRUCE E. SEELY & PAUL F. BARRETT, THE
BEST TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD (2006).
121. Willem van Boom & Marco Loos, Introduction to COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER LAW 3 (Willem van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007).
[Vol. 62:1:1
2009] AGGREGATE LITIGATION ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 27
Within the United States, the notion of nationalized substan-
tive law has sparked considerable controversy. The debate takes a ra-
ther circuitous form, however, focusing not so much on new national
legislation as on the preemption doctrine. Defendant manufacturers
often contend that existing ex ante regulation by federal administra-
tive agencies displaces substantial areas of ex post state-law litigation,
particularly as to product liability in tort.122 The ferment over preemp-
tion has spawned multiple scholarly conferences, 123 with the Supreme
Court taking four preemption cases for decision over two successive
terms. 1
24
One must take care, nevertheless, to avoid overstating the ef-
fect that economic integration might have on civil procedure. The still-
modest degree of similarity between the United States and Europe
with regard to aggregate litigation does not portend a more dramatic
convergence toward any particular model, much less the U.S.-style
class action with all its accoutrements. European leaders speak of de-
signing distinctively European solutions that do not import what they
122. On the prospects for preemption of product liability actions and the debate over the def-
erence, if any, owed by courts to the pro-preemption stance of the Bush Administration, see Mary
J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV.
1089 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chev-
ron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. iss. 1, art. 5 (2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art5; Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort
Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. iss. 1, art. 4 (2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art4; Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in
Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449
(2008). For broader challenges to the current doctrinal framework for preemption itself, see Ro-
derick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). On the
distinctiveness of the U.S. approach to ex ante regulation and ex post litigation, see Samuel Issa-
charoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2007).
123. See FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein
& Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (collecting articles prepared for American Enterprise Institute
conference); Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption Doc-
trine, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (2008).
124. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that Federal Trade Com-
mission's regulatory framework for "light" cigarettes does not preempt action under state unfair
trade practices statute); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that state prod-
uct liability action for defective design and inadequate warning would give rise to a state law
"requirement" expressly preempted by federal law requirements imposed via premarket approval
of Class III medical device by Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")); Desiano v. Warner-
Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), affid by an equally divided Court sub. nom. Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (non-precedential affirmance of lower court decision
that FDA approval of prescription drug labeling does not impliedly preempt state tort action un-
der fraud exception to state regulatory compliance defense); Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt.
2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (No. 06-1249) (considering whether FDA approval of
prescription drug labeling impliedly preempts state product liability action).
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see as the "litigation culture" of the United States. 125 EU Competition
Commissioner Neelie Kroes emphasizes: "I do not want to cut and
paste an American-style system here. We must avoid excessive levels
of litigation."126 EU Consumer Protection Commissioner Meglena Ku-
neva adds: "This is not a John Grisham story."127 The point here is not
merely rhetorical, however.
b. Achieving Closure Versus Enabling Litigation
One can lend greater specificity to the rhetoric from European
policymakers. In a recent book, Christopher Hodges ventures that
"[t]he key question that is facing European legislators is how to enable
collective redress without producing the undesirable consequences
that are associated with the most obvious historical model, namely the
US class action." 128 To put the point somewhat differently, one might
say that Europe seeks to strike a precarious balance-to facilitate the
closure of related civil claims in the aggregate but, at the same time,
not to "enable" litigation.129
The potential for aggregate procedure to enable litigation lies
precisely in the possibility that aggregation might bring more claims
into the civil justice system by making economically viable some
claims that otherwise would not garner legal representation on an in-
dividual basis. 130 Aggregation, however, is just one way in which a
given civil justice system might enable litigation. In this light, one
may situate procedures for aggregation in continuity with surrounding
rules and practices that affect the economics of litigation. In the Unit-
ed States, two such features add to the attraction of class action litiga-
tion, at least by comparison to Europe: the default rule for member-
ship in the aggregate unit and the lack of linkage between
responsibility for legal fees and litigation outcome.
The usual mode of U.S.-style class action litigation on an opt-
out basis has the effect of positioning class counsel to garner a lawyer-
client relationship with class members through the comparatively low-
125. See sources cited supra note 20.
126. Kieron Wood, Judge Raps EU Competition Law Plans, SUN. BUS. POST (Dublin), Mar.
19, 2006, at 27, available at 2006 WLNR 5121216.
127. Meglena Kuneva, EU Comm'r for Consumer Prot., Speech Before the European Parlia-
ment: Consumer Strategy 2007-2013 (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/commission_barroso/kuneva/speeches/verbatim transcr.speech13032007_en.pdf, at 8.
128 HODGES, REFORM, supra note 13, at 1.
129. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
130. The Supreme Court has characterized this enabling function as no less than "[t]he pol-
icy at the very core of the class action mechanism." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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cost method of a class certification ruling from the court. Class counsel
need not undertake a potentially high-cost campaign of client recruit-
ment, as would be necessary, in practical effect, under the opposite de-
fault rule of opt-in. An opt-out rule, coupled with the relative rarity of
opt-outs in practice, 131 has the further effect of boosting the size of the
class and thus the basis for class counsel's fee award in the event of
success-again, at least by comparison to an opt-in proceeding.
Even within the "litigation culture" attributed to the United
States, class actions remain far from a risk-free enterprise. Class
counsel stand to lose their investment in the litigation in the absence
of a judgment or settlement that positions them to seek a fee award.
This risk nonetheless remains of a kind broadly analogous to the no-
tion of limited liability embraced in corporate law as a way to attract
investment by shareholders: they, too, might lose their entire invest-
ment if the corporation is a flop, but they stand to suffer no additional
loss beyond that sum. The widespread embrace in Europe of "loser-
pays" rules moves beyond the litigation equivalent of limited liability
by giving rise to an additional downside risk: the possibility of also
having to bear the fees of one's opponent. 132
Aggregate procedure as an option for closure need not entail
the embrace of measures that further enable litigation, whether by
boosting the potential upside or cabining the potential downside of the
litigation. A given procedural regime might enable with one hand but
disable, or at least not further enable, with the other. Even while ag-
gregate litigation in one or another form has become less exceptional
across the Western world, Europe still has not converged toward U.S.-
style class actions and shows no sign of doing so. The main inhibitors
of such a convergence toward the U.S. class action format consist of
differences not only over the particulars of aggregation itself but also
over surrounding features that affect the attractiveness of such litiga-
tion.
In broad-brush terms, much of Europe appears to regard ag-
gregation more as a way to resolve efficiently those related civil claims
that otherwise have entered the civil justice system and less as a
131. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt.Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2004) ("Opt-
outs from class participations and objections to class action resolutions are rare.").
132. In some European systems, however, a market has emerged for insurance coverage
whereby a party may hedge against the risk that a loss on the merits will trigger responsibility
for its opponent's legal fees under the loser-pays rule. See MARIE GRYPHON, GREATER JUSTICE,
LOWER COST: HOW A "LOSER PAYS" RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM,
MANHATTAN INST., CIV. JUSTICE REP. NO. 11, at 16-18 (2008), available at http://www.manhatan.
institute.org/pdf/cjr- 1.pdf.
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means to alter the claim rate itself. Opt-out procedures remain very
much the exception in Europe, albeit, not entirely unheard of.' 33 One
must take care, moreover, to state the comparison here in relative
terms. Aggregation in any form enhances the attractiveness of claim-
ing by increasing the variance of outcomes in the litigation. 134 Still,
the relative emphasis in Europe on closure over enabling is revealing.
Such a view accords considerable normative significance to the indi-
vidual civil claim in the sense of taking it as something like a strong
baseline for what one might call the appropriate level of claiming.
135
On this view, aggregate procedure-if embraced at all-largely comes
along afterwards to deal with the claims already in the system.
This is not to say that the individual claim carries no norma-
tive weight in the United States. Class actions remain the deviation,
not the norm, in U.S. civil procedure, 136 and they accordingly call for
an affirmative justification for their certification. In the United States,
nonetheless, the "policy at the very core of the class action mecha-
nism" consists of altering the claim rate.13 Going from a world of few,
if any, claims marketable on an individual basis to a world in which
all are now marketable via an opt-out class action is no small step. It
amounts to a dramatic enabling of litigation. On this point, the con-
trast between the United States and Europe makes for an ironic jux-
taposition. The nation known in stylized fashion for a kind of "cowboy"
individualism actually accords less normative significance to the indi-
133. See supra notes 64, 105, 110-11 and accompanying text.
134. On the centrality of variance, and hence of aggregation, to settlement behavior, see Jo-
seph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Per-
spective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2006) (noting that "increases in variance can increase a
lawsuit's settlement option value").
135. One commentator traces this view to deeply rooted features of continental legal systems:
[Clivil law nations interpret a class action-even with an opt-out provision-
as an infringement of a non-representative plaintiffs right to decide when
and how to exercise his or her right to a cause of action. Because the right to
an individual cause of action is inviolate and cannot be overcome by argu-
ments of social or judicial efficiency, civil law nations resist a wide rule allow-
ing representative actions.
S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Pol-
icy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (2008).
136. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979) (characterizing the class action
as "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual
named parties only"). The Court recently reaffirmed this principle. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.
Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008) (rejecting the doctrine of "virtual representation" as a proper exception to
the general rule against preclusion of non-parties, for such a doctrine effectively would recognize
"a common-law kind of class action' ... shorn of the procedural protections prescribed in ...
Rule 23").
137. Supra note 130.
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vidual civil claim, in a sense, than do nations in which ideals of social-
ism and collectivization continue to enjoy greater purchase.
Even in U.S. class action doctrine, nonetheless, one aspect of
the enabling function remains a point of lingering uncertainty in the
settlement context. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Su-
preme Court left open the possibility that some class actions might be
certified for purposes of settlement that could not be certified for trial,
pointing to the greater manageability of the former within the par-
lance of the procedural requirements for class certification. 138 The
Court specifically rejected the strict, categorical view taken by the
Third Circuit, which had posited that a proposed class action may not
be certified for settlement when it could not be certified for trial.
139
The breadth of the window left open by Amchem for settlement-only
classes remains unclear, however. Significant controversy continues to
attend the notion of a class settlement negotiated by class counsel
"disarmed" by their inability to threaten the defendant with an actual
class-wide trial or other adversarial litigation of roughly similar
breadth.1
40
The uncertain status of settlement-only class actions in the
U.S. setting sheds additional light on the seeming European prefer-
ence for closure over enabling. In their Essay in this issue, Samuel Is-
sacharoff and Geoffrey Miller insightfully question whether the desire
for closure in the aggregate without the enabling of litigation in the
aggregate will emerge as a stable equilibrium in Europe over the long
run. 141 Aggregate closure without the threat of aggregate adversarial
litigation might undermine the very peace being sought. This concern
is far from hypothetical. If anything, recent experience in Europe in-
138. See 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certi-
fication, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable
management problems .... for the proposal is that there be no trial.").
139. Id. at 593 ("The Third Circuit's opinion [that each of Rule 23 requirements must be sat-
isfied without taking into account the settlement] bears modification."). Some commentators go
further to question the constitutionality, under Article III, of settlement-only class actions. Mar-
tin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Re-
quirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006).
140. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621:
[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule
23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of lit-
igation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel con-
fined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press
for a better offer ... and the court would face a bargain proffered for its ap-
proval without benefit of adversarial investigation.
(citation omitted).
141. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009).
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volves a striking separation of closure and enabling functions in ag-
gregate procedure.
The next Subsection elaborates on collective settlement actions
in the Netherlands. For now, their singular feature consists of their
authorization of aggregation on an opt-out basis-itself a marked de-
parture from practices elsewhere in Europe-but exclusively for pur-
poses of settlement, not for trial.1 42 One might say that Dutch proce-
dure brings about a full-scale Amchem-ization of aggregate litigation,
casting it exclusively as an avenue for peacemaking, not as a way to
enable claiming in an adversarial posture.
2. Structural Dynamics Across the Atlantic
To note that the United States and the nation-states of Europe
have embraced differing mixtures of closure and enabling functions for
aggregate litigation is not enough. Such an account would miss the
structural dynamics to which those differences give rise. Here, I re-
turn to the problem of regulatory mismatches but, now, on a trans-
Atlantic scale. The connection between aggregation and the underly-
ing scope of commerce again provides a subtext for the discussion. The
principal setting for mismatches in aggregate litigation on a trans-
Atlantic scale has consisted of securities fraud suits of a commensu-
rately trans-Atlantic scope.
It is a commonplace observation in recent years that capital
markets, like so many others, are global, not national. 143 Some U.S.
observers have expressed considerable consternation over the loss of
market share by U.S. exchanges to competitor markets in Europe and
elsewhere for initial public offerings of securities. 144 Others see the
same as reflecting more of a sorting effect. Use of a U.S. stock ex-
change appears to bring with it a premium in market capitalization,
along with a comparatively robust regime of enforcement for securities
regulation. Use of other nations' exchanges, on the other hand, gener-
ally brings issuers a different mix of capitalization and regulation.
145
The trading of securities on multiple markets forms the back-
drop for the new trans-Atlantic mismatches in aggregate litigation.
142. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
143. On the cross-listing of publicly traded firms on multiple exchanges, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 236-42 (2007).
144. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION x (2006),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (discuss-
ing the reasons for "[t]he loss of U.S. public market competitiveness compared to global public
markets"). For further analysis of competition among stock exchanges, see Chris Brummer,
Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008).
145. See Coffee, supra note 143, at 245-46.
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Securities in a given firm sold on multiple exchanges, coupled with al-
legations of financial fraud concerning the firm, place great pressure
on the court responsible for resolving those allegations. Here, again,
the scope of resolution tends to expand to the scope of the underlying
disputed conduct. As in the U.S. domestic sphere, the tendency has
been for the court to assert authority to resolve claims on a scale that
outstrips the territorial authority of the government within which the
court is constituted. Interestingly enough, mismatches of this sort
emanating from the United States have the potential to spur the de-
velopment of distinctively European modes of aggregation. Juxtaposi-
tion of securities fraud litigation involving Vivendi Universal and
Royal Dutch/Shell Transport ("Royal Dutch Shell"), respectively, illus-
trates this dynamic.
a. Mismatches Emanating from the United States
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation146 involved a
securities class action in federal district court in New York that was,
in many respects, quite routine within the U.S. context. The basic al-
legation on the merits involved misrepresentations concerning Viven-
di's financial posture, all to the detriment of its shareholders. So far, a
textbook case of alleged securities fraud that U.S. courts long have
treated by way of class certification, with relatively little difficulty in
procedural terms. The twist here lay in the trans-Atlantic scope of Vi-
vendi's capitalization. Though the plaintiff class encompassed a mod-
est number of U.S. shareholders who had purchased Vivendi shares on
the New York Stock Exchange, the vast majority of shares said to
have been adversely affected by the alleged fraud were purchased on
European exchanges-primarily, the Bourse de Paris.
147
The defendants sought to defeat class certification by suggest-
ing that a defense loss on the merits would be binding on them vis-a-
vis the entire class but that a defense victory might not bind all of the
plaintiff shareholders in Europe. 148 In doctrinal terms, the defendants
146. 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
147. Id. at 81. The Vivendi litigation thus fit the description of what has come to be known as
"foreign-cubed" or "f-cubed" securities class actions-situations in which "a set of (1) foreign
plaintiffs is suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of American securities
laws based on securities transactions in (3) foreign countries." Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank
Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original; defining the term "foreign-cubed");
see also George T. Conway III, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of F-Cubed Securities Litigation,
ENGAGE, Feb. 2008, at 33, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20080313
_FCubed.Securities.Engage.9.1.pdf (essay by defense counsel in Morrison, using equivalently the
term "f-cubed").
148. Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 92.
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argued that the difficulties associated with preclusion of the European
shareholders belied the notion that the proposed class action was "su-
perior" to other procedural alternatives149-here, the prospect of leav-
ing those shareholders with the option to sue in Europe, if at all. The
district court readily agreed that a lack of two-way preclusion would
endanger the superiority of a proposed class action under Rule
23(b)(3). But, said the Vivendi court, its counterparts in the European
nations where most of the plaintiff shareholders were located would
likely give preclusive effect vis-h-vis their citizens to a class-wide
judgment in the United States. 1
50
The Vivendi court's reasoning deserves exposition, for it sheds
light on the practical impact of even the modest degree of convergence
between the United States and Europe with regard to aggregate liti-
gation. In Vivendi, it was not necessary for a given nation to embrace
all of the features associated with U.S.-style class actions-their opt-
out nature, the lack of a "loser-pays" rule for fees, and the like. It was
enough merely that the nation in question had not rejected categori-
cally the notion of representative litigation on some aggregate basis.
Thus, for example, the opt-in, test-case approach of German civil pro-
cedure for securities claims-a quite modest form of voluntary con-
solidation-was not enough for the Vivendi court to conclude that a
German court would accord preclusive effect to a U.S.-court judgment
rendered on a representative basis. Though both are forms of aggrega-
tion, representative litigation and consolidated litigation differ as to
the party status of the affected claimants, among other matters. In
consolidated litigation, all claimants are parties, whereas the whole
point of representative litigation is for certain named parties to repre-
sent many others described simply in terms of their general character-
149. See id. at 91 (referencing the required finding under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) that a class
action must be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy").
150. Id. at 107. An influential earlier opinion from the Second Circuit, authored by the iconic
Judge Henry Friendly, had cast the inquiry in terms that were, if anything, even more favorable
to the encompassing of non-U.S. shareholders in a U.S. court securities class action. See Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling for the exclusion of non-U.S.
shareholders from a proposed class action in a U.S. court only if there exists a "near certainty"
that a foreign court would not recognize the resulting class judgment); cf. Morrison, 547 F.3d at
173 (reaffirming Bersch as to the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts over securities fraud
claims of foreign shareholders, but not speaking to the issue of class certification). The Vivendi
court recognized that intervening case law from the Second Circuit had cast the satisfaction of
applicable class certification requirements in preponderance terms. See 242 F.R.D. at 83 (citing
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006)).
For analysis of Vivendi in the European literature, see Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res
Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31, 37
(2008).
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istics. But the embrace of representative litigation in England-albeit,
not of an opt-out sort akin to Rule 23(b)(3)-was sufficient to make
preclusion likely there, such that the U.S. class action in Vivendi could
include English shareholders.1
51
In more of a stretch, the Vivendi court went on to conclude that
preclusion problems also were unlikely to arise as to the substantial
majority of shareholders located in France. The court pointed to
French precedents that call for the recognition of foreign judgments,
as long as they do not "infringe [on] principles of universal justice."
152
And that hardly could be true in Vivendi, the court said, given the se-
rious consideration given by the French government in recent years to
a major proposal for representative litigation that would encompass
the securities area, among others. 153 On this view, just the serious
consideration of representative litigation-even short of its actual
adoption-was enough to support the inclusion of the French share-
holders in the U.S. class action.
The Vivendi court's analysis of developments in France met
with subsequent disagreement-from within its own federal district,
no less. In a 2008 decision involving yet another trans-Atlantic securi-
ties fraud class action proposed to include European investors-In re
Alstom SA Securities Litigation'54-a different judge for the Southern
District of New York concluded that French investors must be ex-
cluded. Able to draw on developments in France since the decision in
Vivendi, the Alstom court pointed to the conclusion ultimately reached
by French policymakers with respect to proposals for representative
litigation-namely, that opt-out procedures would indeed contravene
principles established by the French Constitutional Council.1 55 For the
Alstom court, the resulting unlikelihood that a French court would af-
ford preclusive effect to a U.S.-style opt-out class judgment sufficed to
defeat the notion that such an action would comprise a "superior" way
to resolve French investors' claims.
Superiority analysis for purposes of class certification, more-
over, coexists with other procedural doctrines-most prominently, fo-
rum non conveniens156-that cut against the inclusion of European
151. 242 F.R.D. at 102-03.
152. Id. at 100 (quoting Lautour v. Guiraud, Cass. le civ., May 25, 1948, Bull. civ. I).
153. Id. at 101-02.
154. 253 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
155. Id. at 285-87.
156. For an overview of forum non conveniens limitafions in U.S. procedural doctrine, see
RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL
PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 37-
73 (2007). For an example of a post-Vivendi dismissal of transnational securities fraud class ac-
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shareholders when some avenue of aggregate recourse is available in
their home country. Even on its own terms, superiority analysis does
not obviously cut in a single direction. True enough, a U.S.-style class
action that would not yield two-way preclusion would be problematic.
The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added
the opt-out class action precisely to ensure two-way preclusion.157 But,
by the same token, such a class action might well be all the more "su-
perior" to available procedural alternatives when the home country of
a given shareholder affords her no avenue for recourse on an aggre-
gate basis. On this second view, a U.S.-court class action-even by
way of a procedural format dramatically different from what a given
shareholder would have in her home country-might well be superior
to no action at all.
Still another nuance to the superiority analysis flows from the
observed aftermath of the Vivendi decision itself. Several institutional
investors from Europe with substantial Vivendi share holdings subse-
quently brought conventional, individual actions in the United States
for securities fraud, with the notable assistance of plaintiffs' law firms
in this country. 158  By comparison, the superiority of an all-
encompassing U.S.-court class action might lie in its capacity to avoid
a situation in which big-cat investors obtain recourse on their own but
smaller-fish investors do not.
The ultimate propriety of U.S.-court class actions comprised
overwhelmingly of non-U.S. claimants remains a question unresolved
by the Supreme Court.159 That question, however, is not my primary
concern here; rather, the circumstances behind both Vivendi and Als-
tom suffice to expose the structural dynamics of aggregate litigation
across the Atlantic. In response to such decisions, European nations
might seek to develop their own distinctive avenues for aggregate re-
dress for their citizens. One can understand such a European response
as an effort to meet mismatches emanating from the United States
with home-grown procedures to lessen the degree of mismatch in one
tions on forum non conveniens grounds, see LaSala v. UBS, AG, 510 F. Supp. 2d 213 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3), advisory committee's note to 1966 amendments (discussing
the problem of one-way intervention that the innovation of the opt-out class action was designed
to avoid).
158. See Risk Metrics Group, Securities Litigation Watch, When Opting Out is Really Opting
In, http://slw.riskmetrics.com12007/11/post.html (Nov. 7, 2007) ("A number of large international
institutional investors that were excluded from the class definition [in Vivendi] have now started
to file individual or group actions in the United States.").
159. For a scholarly treatment of multinational class actions in the securities setting, see
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Ju-
risdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14 (2007).
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sense: European procedures used exclusively for European claimants
would increase the congruence between the scope of preclusion on an
aggregate basis and the governing authority of the nation-state that
has constituted the rendering court.
The foregoing enterprise remains an unstable one, however, for
it could perpetuate-even accentuate-the mismatch between the
scope of preclusion and the authority of the rendering court, on the
one hand, and the scope of the underlying disputed conduct, on the
other. A world of globalized capitalization is a world in which allega-
tions of securities fraud on the part of a given business necessarily
ripple across the world. Yet, a regime in which the shareholders in
each nation essentially must fend for themselves under their home na-
tion's procedures makes for a kind of balkanization out of line with the
global scope of the underlying misconduct. It is a replay in the trans-
national sphere of the notion of each U.S. state "minding its own busi-
ness" in litigation.
A second effect is less well understood and forms the focal point
for the remainder of this Part. One can see in the European landscape
the emergence of structural dynamics broadly similar to those exhib-
ited by U.S. class action litigation in state courts pre-CAFA-namely,
the strategic selection of the forum for the aggregate proceeding, both
as a way for the defendant to seek an advantageous deal and as an
outgrowth of competition within the plaintiffs' bar over control of the
litigation. As to both, the pathbreaking Royal Dutch Shell settlement
in the Netherlands warrants exposition.
b. Mismatch Begetting Mismatch
Spurred by the earlier filing in the United States of a Vivendi-
style class action-that is, one proposed to encompass shareholders in
Europe, along with their American counterparts 160-Royal Dutch
Shell negotiated what is, in effect, a $450 million class settlement for
European shareholders and proposed it to the Amsterdam Court of
Appeals for approval under the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of
Mass Damages. 16 1 Recall that the unusual feature of this Act consists
of its authorization of aggregation on an opt-out basis, but only for
purposes of settlement, not for adversarial litigation.
16 2
160. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715-16 (D.N.J.
2007) (describing Shell's motions to dismiss non-U.S. claimants from the class action).
161. See Precis Settlement Agreement 1-2 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://
https://www.royaldutchshellsettlement.comlDocuments/Settlement%20Agreement.pdf (summa-
rizing settlement agreement).
162. See supra notes 104-05, 142 and accompanying text.
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The Dutch court has yet to approve the proposed deal, but one
crucial point warrants attention regardless: the structural dynamics of
aggregate procedure relate closely to competition in the market for re-
presentation of claimants. The Royal Dutch Shell deal not only splits
off European shareholders from their U.S. counterparts, who together
would have comprised the plaintiff class in the proposed U.S.-court
class action. The deal also involves a splitting of the proposed class re-
presentation-specifically, an effort by one U.S. securities plaintiffs'
law firm (Grant & Eisenhofer, which negotiated the Royal Dutch Shell
deal on the European claimants' side) to gain effective control of that
litigation in the face of an attempt by a rival law firm (Bernstein,
Liebhard & Lifshitz) to get all shareholders worldwide into a single
U.S.-court class action. As in the U.S. domestic setting, aggregate pro-
cedure here serves as a proxy, in part, for competitive rivalry between
plaintiffs' law firms.
The interesting strategic question is why Royal Dutch Shell
would want to cut a separate deal for European shareholders with a
plaintiffs' law firm other than the one that was pushing the proposed
U.S.-court class action-indeed, a deal contingent on a subsequent de-
termination by the U.S. court to exclude the European shareholders
from the proposed U.S. class action. 163 From the settling defendant's
standpoint, the most notable feature of the Royal Dutch Shell deal
does not lie so much in its widely reported invocation of the Dutch Act.
An equally significant aspect of the deal consists of its "most favored
nation" ("MFN") clause-that is, a promise to all shareholders to boost
the benefits under the deal in the event that the remaining U.S.
shareholders somehow manage to fare better than their European
counterparts in what remains of the U.S.-court class action. 1
64
Most-favored-nation clauses have spawned a scholarly litera-
ture of their own in the United States. 65 The crucial strategic dimen-
sion of an MFN clause consists of the settling defendant's credible
commitment that the settlement terms it has provided are likely to be
the best deal that the defendant will make available for anyone else.
MFN clauses effectively enable the defendant to say: "Don't think
about getting a better deal, because any better deal that we cut for you
163. Id. at 2.
164. See id. at 6-8.
165. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Exploiting Future Settlements: A
Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining, 35 RAND J. ECON.
467 (2004); Kathryn E. Spier, "Tied to the Mast" Most Favored Nation Clauses in Settlement
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Spier, Tied to the Mast]; Kathryn E. Spier,
The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. ECON. 78
(2003) [hereinafter Spier, Use of MFN Clauses].
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will oblige us to boost the benefits for everyone we've already paid."
Formal economic analysis reinforces this point, observing that MFN
clauses "limit the surplus that future plaintiffs can capture in settle-
ment negotiations, surplus that may be shared among the defendant
and the early-settling plaintiffs."166 This effect is especially pro-
nounced when the stakes of the early-settling claims and those that
remain to be settled are roughly similar,167 as is likely to be true when
all claims concern equity shares in the same defendant business. A
share is a share, though a given shareholder, of course, might hold
more shares in total than another.
Details aside, the gambit on Royal Dutch Shell's part should
begin to sound curiously familiar from the standpoint of the U.S. do-
mestic experience. The defendant's gambit appears to be to use the
Dutch settlement to establish a credible baseline for resolution of the
remaining U.S. dimensions of the litigation. Yet that baseline flows
from a procedural format in the Netherlands that, by its terms, could
not have given rise to adversarial litigation on an aggregate basis.
One hardly can gainsay the value of this gambit to Royal Dutch Shell,
given its willingness to countenance a fee award request for a reported
$47 million in connection with the Dutch settlement. 68
This is far from a suggestion that Grant & Eisenhofer was
completely "disarmed" in negotiations on behalf of European share-
holders. In light of U.S. precedents like Vivendi, there remained at
least a possibility that the U.S.-court class action otherwise might
have encompassed the European shareholders. But the strategic im-
plications of such an action would be different in the absence of a sep-
arate settlement for shareholders in Europe.
An all-encompassing U.S.-court class action would have posi-
tioned Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz to seek to leverage the presence
of the U.S. shareholders in the class so as to garner a deal-and thus a
166. Spier, Tied to the Mast, supra note 165, at 104; see also Spier, Use of MFN Clauses, su-
pra note 165, at 92.
This is not to say that claimants outside the class who might be affected by an MFN clause in
a class settlement agreement necessarily would have recourse within the settlement review
process, at least under current U.S. doctrine. Even while acknowledging the likely effect of an
MFN clause on claimants who had opted out of a class settlement, the D.C. Circuit went so far as
to hold that such claimants lack standing to challenge an MFN clause as part of the district
court's hearing on the fairness of that settlement. In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215
F.3d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Under this view, "the district court's duty [under Rule 23(e)] is to
the class members themselves; it lacks the power to conduct a free-ranging analysis as to the
broader implications of the proposed settlement agreement." Id. at 30.
167. See Spier, Tied to the Mast, supra note 165, at 106.
168. See Jessica Jones, Bad Blood Over Royal Dutch Fees, AM. LAW., June 2007, at 58 (re-
porting that the Royal Dutch Shell settlement provides for $47 million in fees to be divided be-
tween Grant & Eisenhofer and two allied law firms).
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common fund from which any fee award would flow-that would also
include the European shareholders. 169 By way of the MFN clause in-
cluded in the Dutch settlement, Royal Dutch Shell would deploy a
converse kind of leverage. Royal Dutch Shell could use the Dutch deal
for European shareholders only-a deal priced without the threat of
trial in the Netherlands-to drive the terms for resolution of the secu-
rities fraud dispute overall. Developments in the United States after
the announcement of the Dutch settlement bear out in spades the cle-
verness of the defendant's gambit. With the claims of the substantial
majority of shareholders in Europe proposed for resolution via the
Dutch procedure, Royal Dutch Shell announced in June 2008 an
"agreement in principle" to resolve the claims of U.S. shareholders
for-surprise, surprise!-"amounts proportional to the amounts pay-
able to the potential participants in the proposed Dutch settlement."'
170
The important big-picture observation here is that the Dutch
settlement stands as a less transparent version of what the United
States has already seen: mismatches in aggregate litigation tend to
beget mismatches in aggregate settlement. In the U.S. setting, the
first form of mismatch consisted, prior to CAFA, of the certification of
nationwide classes by the anomalous state court inclined to govern the
country; and the second form consisted of settlement classes parked by
colluding class counsel and defendants in a friendly, approving state
forum."' The story of the Royal Dutch Shell litigation admits of both
phenomena, but with a bit of indirection.
The first form of mismatch consists of the attempt at a Vivendi-
style U.S.-court class action against Royal Dutch Shell that would
have encompassed shareholders worldwide. The second form of mis-
match consists of the settlement reached in the Netherlands that-
although nominally limited to European shareholders and touted sim-
ply as a "Uniquely European Resolution to [a] European Problem"
172
-effectively sets a settlement price ceiling for all shareholders world-
wide by way of the MFN clause. Once again, attempts at mismatch in
contested aggregations have yielded still further efforts at mismatch
169. This also can be accomplished, to a degree, even when the scope of aggregation corre-
sponds to nation-state boundaries. See supra note 40 (discussing British Airways and Virgin At-
lantic settlement).
170. See Press Release, Royal Dutch Shell, Shell Announces Settlement of Reserve-Related
Claims with US Investors (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.shell.comthome/content
/investor/news-and library/press releases/2008/us reserves settlement_06032008.html.
171. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 26, at 1663-68.
172. See Press Release, Grant & Eisenhofer, European Investor Group and Royal Dutch
Shell Agree to $450 Million Settlement over Shell's Misstatements of Proven Oil & Gas Reserves
(Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.lawdragon.com/images/uploads/pdf/grant-royal
_4197.pdf.
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in the settlement domain, all with the overlay of competition between
plaintiffs' law firms for control of the litigation and defendants' efforts
to play on that rivalry.
The remaining question is whether Amsterdam ultimately will
emerge as the trans-Atlantic successor to anomalous state courts with-
in the United States-as a kind of procedural "red-light district" for
aggregate dealmaking, like its namesake for other transactions pur-
sued by consenting parties.173 The answer to this question turns on
the latitude available for still another round of regulatory mismatches
that, once more, have counterparts in the U.S. experience-namely,
the framework for transnational recognition of judgments, such as to
protect them from collateral attack. The next Part takes up that sub-
ject. The central point for now is this: much attention has focused thus
far on the variations in aggregate procedures seen across the Atlantic.
But those differences stand to dwindle in practical significance insofar
as the law of preclusion enables the binding effect of a judgment in the
aggregate to transcend the territorial boundaries of the government
within which the rendering court operates. If anything, the degree of
difference in aggregate procedure now emerging across the Western
world makes efforts to generate and to exploit mismatches all the
more inviting.
Whatever its ultimate fate, the Royal Dutch Shell settlement
marks the emergence in the trans-Atlantic realm of a need for hard
thinking about the grounds for proper preclusion in global litigation.
Those grounds, as much as the minutia of procedural variations across
Europe and the United States, comprise the subject now ripe for dis-
cussion across the Atlantic. As the next Part shall add, any such dis-
cussion of transnational preclusion should also encompass the appro-
priate latitude for private contracts to bring about a kind of de facto
governance in the aggregate.
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
Within the United States, there at least exists a formal gov-
ernmental unit with authority commensurate with the scope of na-
tionwide commerce. As noted earlier, both CAFA and the Anti-
Injunction Act in federal law provide a measure of national govern-
173. Ironically enough, consensual civil settlement on an aggregate basis actually seems to
be faring somewhat better in Amsterdam in recent years than the usual consensual commerce in
the red-light district. See Marlise Simons, Amsterdam Tries Upscale Fix for Red-Light District
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A10.
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ance over potential regulatory mismatches in nationwide class actions.
But no counterpart governing body exists at the trans-Atlantic level,
at least not in formal terms. The result is to place all the more pres-
sure on the vehicles that remain to regulate mismatches. Here, too,
the U.S. experience is illuminating, for it both identifies the main ve-
hicles for such de facto regulation-preclusion principles and private
contracts-and highlights the hard questions presented by each. The
Sections of this Part speak to these two vehicles, in turn.
A. Governance by Preclusion
Within U.S. practice, the preclusive effect that a state-court
class judgment may exert over class members nationwide remains
closely related to the question of who stands to determine that effect.
There are two basic answers to the "who" question: the rendering
court system (that is, the trial-level court that first enters the class
judgment and the appellate courts positioned to undertake direct re-
view of its rulings) and the multiplicity of courts in which class mem-
bers might sue anew on claims purportedly settled in the class action.
The latter vehicle consists of "collateral attacks. ' 174
The notion that proper preclusion-like beauty-may be in the
eye of the beholder stems, in part, from the sheer multiplicity of courts
in which collateral attacks might be brought by a member of a na-
tionwide class. The new trans-Atlantic landscape portends to replicate
at the transnational level the multiplicity of courts in which class
counsel might seek certification of a nationwide class action over the
defendant's opposition or settling counsel might seek approval of a na-
tionwide class settlement. As Part II suggested, the search will be on
once again for the anomalous court-this time, one inclined to bust the
deal rather than to bless it. In the United States, this process of col-
lateral attack may take place notwithstanding substantial consensus
about the basics of class action procedure across federal- and state-
court systems and, for that matter, substantial consensus on preclu-
sion principles outside of aggregate litigation. A landscape in which
the nation-states of the West embrace markedly different notions of
174. This understanding of collateral attacks distinguishes, on the one hand, review by
courts other than those of the rendering judicial system via the ordinary process of direct review
and, on the other hand, situations in which a lawsuit nominally separate from the underlying
class action is channeled back to the rendering court-for example, within the federal judicial
system, via a consolidation order by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The latter
scenario presents a collateral lawsuit in the sense of one separate from the class judgment whose
preclusive effect it seeks to challenge, but not a case of collateral attack as understood here. The
same court that rendered the class judgment ultimately stands to rule on the preclusion defense
invoked to shut down the collateral lawsuit before it.
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what makes for a sensible regime for aggregate litigation, if anything,
will accentuate the tendency to seek out the anomalous court.
A significant additional source of difficulty in the U.S. setting
stems not from the multiplicity of possible fora for collateral attacks
but, more fundamentally, from longstanding confusion over the cen-
tral concepts implicated by such attacks. The nature of this confusion
occupies two of my previous writings, 175 thereby enabling me to
streamline the discussion here. Simply put, the law of collateral at-
tacks on class settlements in the United States exhibits confusion be-
tween two different things: concerns discernible at the outset of the
class action that bear on its legitimacy irrespective of its outcome and
concerns discernible only at later stages of the proceeding that relate
inextricably to its outcome.
Much of the confusion stems from the Supreme Court itself-
primarily, though by no means exclusively, the Court's 1985 decision
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.176 The upshot of Shutts is that a
state court properly may assert personal jurisdiction over the absent
members of a class, even when those persons lack "minimum contacts"
with the rendering state. 177 The Shutts Court held that, in lieu of
"minimum contacts," an array of procedural protections make such a
proceeding fundamentally fair and, hence, constitutionally permissi-
ble. 178 The inclusion of "adequate representation at all times" in the
Shutts Court's checklist stems from the Court's own pre-Rule-23
treatment of adequate representation as an aspect of constitutional
due process in its 1940 Hansberry v. Lee decision. 179 So far, so good.
The mixture of personal jurisdiction, constitutional due proc-
ess, and "adequate representation at all times" has made for a vexing
brew, however, for purposes of collateral attacks on class settlements.
The confusion has enabled the plaintiff in a collateral attack to label
as both a jurisdictional defect and a constitutional affront two quite
different aspects of the class representation: structural defects (that go
to the existence of conflicting interests within the class or between the
class and class counsel) and performance defects (that go to whether
175. See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 26, at 1712-20; see also Richard A. Nagareda,
Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287 (2003).
176. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
177. Id. at 811-12. The holding in Shutts effectively blessed the assertion of personal juris-
diction via nationwide, opt-out class actions in the federal courts as well, for those courts must
use the same framework for the assertion of personal jurisdiction as the courts of the states in
which they sit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (generally establishing personal jurisdiction in fed-
eral district court on same grounds as counterpart state courts of general jurisdiction).
178. 472 U.S. at 812.
179. Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)).
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the class settlement terms negotiated by class counsel amount to a fair
deal). Only structural defects are discernible from the outset of the ac-
tion and bespeak a proceeding illegitimate without regard to its out-
come-a kind of illegitimacy equivalent to that presented by a lack of
proper jurisdiction. Indeed, a commonplace insight from the economic
literature on class actions is that they carry an inherent risk of shirk-
ing-even on the part of unconflicted class counsel for a highly cohe-
sive class-that might yield a too-cheap settlement. Yet current U.S.
doctrine is susceptible to being misread as suggesting that this risk
inherent in any class action can amount to a defect of constitutional
and jurisdictional proportions. 180
The structure of the modern class action rule itself distin-
guishes between matters that bear on the certification of such actions
and those that concern the fairness of any resulting settlement.18' If
the fairness of a class settlement cannot itself supply the grounds
needed to justify class certification-as the Supreme Court rightly un-
derscored in Amcheml 82-so, too, a bad deal cannot render a properly
certified class defective in a due-process sense. Still, federal courts of
appeals have diverged over the permissible latitude for collateral at-
tacks on class settlements predicated on allegations of inadequate rep-
resentation. 8 3
This is hardly to say that inquiry into the fairness of class set-
tlements is unimportant, only that the ordinary process of appellate
review exists for that purpose. If anything, U.S. law has embraced a
lenient conception of the class members who may seek direct review,
180. For more extensive treatment of the distinctions drawn in this paragraph, see Issa-
charoff & Nagareda, supra note 26, at 1678-1700.
181. These two matters are treated in separate subsections of Rule 23. Compare FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a)-(b) (class certification requirements), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (review of class settle-
ment for fairness).
182. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
183. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liability Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that "[o]nce a court has decided that the due process protections did occur for a particular class
member or group of class members, the issue may not be relitigated," but noting the contrary
view in Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd by equally divided Court,
539 U.S. 111 (2003)).
In one much-debated round of litigation, judges of the Ninth Circuit at various points em-
braced three markedly different views of collateral attacks. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d
641, 649 (9th Cir. 1999) (O'Scannlain, J.) (asking simply whether the rendering court afforded
absent class members a "full and fair opportunity" to challenge the adequacy of class representa-
tion); id. at 651 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (asking whether representational adequacy was "fully
and fairly litigated and necessarily decided" by the rendering court); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126
F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997) (Norris, J.) (permitting the collateral attack on the ground that
"[t]o hold otherwise ... would be to require absent class members to monitor the proceedings in
order to secure their rights to adequate representation," something such persons "are not re-
quired" to do).
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empowering all who stand to be bound by the deal to do so, without
the need for formal intervention in the trial-court proceeding on the
fairness of the settlement. 8 4 The law of civil procedure in the United
States, moreover, has long recognized a circumscribed opportunity to
reopen civil judgments due to fraud or new information. 8 5 But the key
point remains that these avenues take place within the channel of di-
rect review, not via a process of searching the land for the anomalous
court in some other judicial system to serve as the forum for a collat-
eral attack.
The point here is not to resolve the ongoing debate within the
United States over collateral attacks but, rather, to draw on the U.S.
experience as a cautionary warning about the level of precision with
which debates over proper preclusion in the transnational sphere
should take place. Whatever the law of preclusion might conclude on
the subject, that body of law is best advised not to use the identical
terminology-"adequate representation at all times"-to embrace both
structural defects and performance defects, both defects of a constitu-
tional or jurisdictional character and those not so, and both intra-class
conflicts discernible from the outset of the proceeding and those that
might emerge only later. Conceptual precision here starts with termi-
nological precision.
The timing for precise thinking could not be more auspicious.
In the world of class certification, one can see decisions like Vivendi as
struggling to formulate a trans-Atlantic counterpart in case law to
Shutts in the U.S. domestic sphere-to lay out the basic conceptual
landscape for aggregate judgments that encompass both U.S. and Eu-
ropean claimants. The landscape for collateral review of such judg-
ments remains even more uncharted, though developments like the
Royal Dutch Shell settlement provide an occasion for movement in
that direction.
Interestingly enough, the main European source of guidance on
the recognition of civil judgments offers a glimmer of hope for im-
provement on the terms of the U.S. debate. The EU's 2000 Regulation
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
("EU Regulation") replaced the earlier Brussels Convention on the
same subjects. 8 6 The EU Regulation understandably does not con-
184. E.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002).
185. E.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b).
186. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 34.1, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter EU Regula-
tion]. On the unsuccessful earlier effort to negotiate an international convention on the recogni-
tion of judgments through the vehicle of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, see
Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity Re-
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sider with any specificity the recognition of judgments by way of ag-
gregate settlements, that phenomenon having gained prominence only
later with developments like the Royal Dutch Shell settlement. The
crucial language of the EU Regulation consists of the general proposi-
tion stated in its Article 34: "A judgment shall not be recognized. . . if
such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member
State in which recognition is sought." Similar language appears in the
ALI's proposal for the recognition of foreign judgments in U.S. courts,
modeled in this regard on Article 34 of the EU Regulation.
8 7
The use of the word "judgment" in both of these sources in-
cludes "inquiry into the process by which the judgment was obtained
in the particular case."18 8 But the standard for the withholding of rec-
ognition on this ground remains "quite high," such that "the proce-
dures in the individual foreign proceeding need only meet an 'interna-
tional standard' of fairness."'1 9 For aggregate litigation, such an
approach effectively would replicate under the auspices of judgment
recognition principles an inquiry rather like the Rule 23(b)(3) superi-
ority analysis undertaken by the U.S. courts in Vivendi and Alstom.
On such a view, the embrace of aggregate procedure along the lines
underlying the judgment in question-perhaps, even if only vaguely
so-might suffice to obligate Forum 2 ("F2") to recognize the judgment
of Forum 1. Still, open questions remain as to the outer limits of this
approach. Recall that the Alstom court declined to encompass French
shareholders when faced with relatively specific indications in delib-
erations over aggregate procedure there that an opt-out approach on
the U.S. model would violate French constitutional principles. 190
quirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 239,
257-61 (2004).
187. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(a)(vi) (2006):
A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the Unit-
ed States if the party resisting recognition or enforcement establishes
that.., the judgment or the claim on which the judgment is based is repug-
nant to the public policy of the United States, or to the public policy of a par-
ticular state of the United States when the relevant legal interest, right, or
policy is regulated by state law.
On the grounding of this language in Article 34 of the EU Regulation, see id. § 5 reporters' notes
at 78-79. On the relationship between the ALI proposal and the Hague Conference negotiations,
see Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, A Different Challenge for the ALL: Herein of
Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635
(2000).
188. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 187, § 5 report-
ers' notes at 77.
189. Id.
190. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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If anything, the EU Regulation contains the makings for more
precise delineation of defects that undermine the legitimacy of the ag-
gregate proceeding as an initial matter, in contrast to those related to
its outcome. The same chapter of the EU Regulation that qualifies the
general obligation to recognize the judgments of other EU nations by
reference to public policy in F2 goes on to emphasize that "[u]nder no
circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed [in F2] as to its
substance." 19' Yet that is precisely what "adequate representation at
all times" would countenance in U.S. law, if construed so broadly as to
embrace collateral inquiry into adequate performance by class counsel
in crafting a deal that is fair for claimants in substance. Again, this is
by no means to say that performance defects somehow do not matter,
only that it is possible to cast them in the manner of the EU Regula-
tion for civil judgments generally: the proper subject for direct review
within the rendering court system. The adequacy of the processes for
direct review, as distinct from the substance of the judgment, accord-
ingly would comprise an appropriate subject for collateral inquiry, as
even the most restrictive regimes suggested for collateral attacks in
the United States would recognize.
192
Whatever the particulars ultimately chosen for collateral re-
view of transnational judgments rendered in the aggregate, the crucial
starting point remains: the discussion best occurs based on precise
conceptualization of the differing meanings that one might attach to
adequate representation. Here, the law of transnational preclusion
would do well to render exceptional the overloaded phrase "adequate
representation at all times" that has long dominated discussions of
collateral attacks in the United States.
A further permutation of the emerging debate over proper pre-
clusion in the transnational setting speaks to the situation presented
by the Royal Dutch Shell settlement. The question of adequate repre-
sentation there recalls the discussion in Part II of European efforts to
separate the capacity of aggregate procedure for purposes of closure
from its potential to enable litigation. 193 The question at which the
Royal Dutch Shell deal hints is whether peace by way of aggregation,
without the threat of litigation, gives rise to a fatal inadequacy in such
aggregate resolution. Can one, in other words, ultimately separate the
closure function from the enabling function? The latitude left by the
Amchem Court for settlement-only class actions-uncertain though its
191. EU Regulation, supra note 186, art. 36.
192. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 649 (9th Cir. 1999) (O'Scannlain, J.) (evincing a
more "restrictive regime").
193. See supra Part II.B.l.b.
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dimensions remain-strongly suggests that they exhibit no knock-
down, categorical due-process defect under the U.S. Constitution. But
it is by no means required for other nations to understand similarly
their own outer limits on proper preclusion, and the search for the
anomalous court as the vehicle for mismatch will continue accordingly.
Interestingly enough, the seeming preference for closure over enabling
in European aggregate procedure arguably suggests that, over time,
the U.S. critics of settlement-only class actions might be the ones who
emerge as the anomaly from a global perspective with regard to proper
preclusion.
Whatever its ultimate parameters, the development of a genu-
inely trans-Atlantic body of learning on proper preclusion in aggregate
litigation has a considerable potential to point beyond procedure to
substantive law. Here, too, comparison of Vivendi and Alstom in the
trans-Atlantic realm to Shutts in the U.S. sphere provides illumina-
tion. It is no accident that the discussion of personal jurisdiction over
the members of the opt-out class in Shutts appeared alongside later
portions of the Court's opinion that address the outer limits imposed
by constitutional due process on the choice of law to govern the merits
of such a lawsuit. 194 Expansion in the preclusive scope of the class be-
yond the territorial authority of the governmental unit that has con-
stituted the rendering court puts increased pressure on the choice of
substantive law to govern the merits. The concern here is that the
substantive law of one state-perhaps an outlier-effectively will gov-
ern the nation.
On this point, the Shutts Court enables with one hand (reject-
ing the due process challenge to personal jurisdiction over the absent
class members, the vast majority of whom lacked "minimum contacts"
with the Kansas forum) but disables at least a bit with the other hand
(holding that the Due Process Clause calls for a non-arbitrary choice of
law to govern the merits). Preclusion on a trans-Atlantic basis por-
tends an analogous debate over the outer bounds for trans-Atlantic
choice of law by the rendering court. The law awaits what one might
call a Euro-Shutts. As I now explain, however, judicial administra-
tion-whether by way of principles for proper preclusion or for choice
of law-does not necessarily represent the only option for governance
of transnational aggregate litigation.
194. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (overturning class
certification on choice-of-law grounds).
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B. Governance by Contract
The multiplicity of procedures for aggregate litigation across
the United States and Europe has implications not just for collateral
attacks and preclusion. It also casts attention to the use of private
contracts as a vehicle for the parties, in effect, to choose in advance
the legal regime that shall govern their relationship. To be sure, con-
tractual relationships are not the only context for aggregate litigation;
tort law deals largely with instances in which the parties have no pre-
existing contract. Even with this important caveat, however, the point
remains that governance might occur even without a governmental
regime commensurate in scope to global commerce, not only by way of
transnational preclusion ex post but also via private contracts ex ante.
Once more, the U.S. experience is instructive.
In recent years, the major challenge to the domain of aggregate
litigation in the United States-particularly, with regard to low-stakes
consumer claims-has come from arbitration provisions in private
contracts. This development proceeds from the well-established use of
arbitration to resolve disputes between sophisticated businesses posi-
tioned to negotiate the full breadth of their contractual relationships
point by point. In consumer contracts, by contrast, the arbitration
clause is not the product of back-and-forth negotiation but, instead, is
presented to the consumer by a seller of goods or services on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. The movement in the direction of arbitration in con-
sumer contracts has proceeded largely unabated. If anything, the Su-
preme Court has contributed significantly to this process in a series of
decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act, reading that statute as
embodying "a federal policy favoring arbitration"195 that may be over-
come based only on generally applicable defenses in the law of con-
tracts, not contractual doctrines that specifically disfavor arbitration
clauses. 196 For the Court, a contractual obligation to arbitrate works a
mere change in the forum for dispute resolution, at least as long as
would-be litigants "effectively may vindicate" their preexisting rights
of action in the arbitral forum.
197
The Court nonetheless has yet to resolve the status of arbitra-
tion clauses that seek to go a step further by not only requiring the
use of arbitration in lieu of litigation but also purporting to waive any
otherwise available opportunity to aggregate claims-whether by way
of a U.S.-style class action or a class-wide arbitration proceeding. Ar-
195. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
196. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
197. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
bitration clauses that contain waivers of aggregation portend a sub-
stantial diminution of the class action domain due to the pervasive-
ness of contracts-particularly, of an adhesive sort-as the basis for
much commerce today.198
Some judicial and scholarly discussions of these waivers in re-
cent years cast doubt on their legitimacy in terms of the proper boun-
dary between what private contracts may do and what only legisla-
tures may do. 199 The basic move here is to take seriously the Court's
foundational insight that the legitimacy of arbitration rests on its
working of a mere change in the forum for dispute resolution, not a
repeal of claimants' private right of action in practical effect. On this
account, only public institutions of government, not contracts among
private persons, may accomplish such repeals.
An additional feature complicates the picture still further. Ar-
bitration clauses that contain waivers of aggregate procedures often
coexist in contracts with provisions to subject the parties' relationship
to the substantive law of a specified sovereign. Here, too, practices
that originated in contracting between sophisticated commercial par-
ties migrated over to contracting that involves unsophisticated con-
sumers. In the commercial setting, it is commonplace for contracts to
include a choice-of-law clause. 200 In U.S. consumer credit card agree-
ments today, moreover, the usual practice is for the issuing bank to
provide, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, for application of the substan-
tive law of its own home base-say, South Dakota. Yet the bank is
quite likely to have selected that location as its home base because of
anomalously favorable substantive law along any number of dimen-
sions-from permissible interest rates to the validity of clauses that
waive aggregation. 20 1 Litigation to challenge waivers of aggregation
then replays the quasi-Newtonian dynamics observed in U.S. class ac-
tion practice: the invocation of anomaly elicits an equal and opposite
invocation of anomaly. Specifically, the bank's effort to project the
substantive law of its home base nationwide begets a nationwide class
198. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1638-39 (2005).
199. Some sources cast the inquiry in terms of whether statutory rights may be vindicated in
the arbitral setting. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2006); J. Maria
Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1764-67 (2006). For elaboration in terms of the contrast in
law reform authority between private contracts and public legislation, see Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1906-07 (2006).
200. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 32, at 5.
201. On the role of federal banking law in accentuating this tendency, see Samuel Issa-
charoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 159-61 (2006).
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action to challenge the waiver in a jurisdiction believed to hold anoma-
lously pro-consumer views on, say, unconscionability as a matter of its
contract law.
20 2
The transnational setting places even greater pressure on both
the tension between private contracts and public governance and the
relationship of arbitration to choice-of-law principles. As in the United
States, efforts at regulatory mismatch in the scope of aggregate litiga-
tion are likely to elicit corresponding efforts at mismatch in the reach
of contracts that purport to foreclose such litigation. The important
observation at this early juncture concerns the relative lack of trans-
parency that such a process could exhibit. The game could be to make
claiming unviable through the interaction of an arbitration clause, a
waiver of aggregation, and a choice-of-law clause.
The near-uniform recognition afforded to class actions across
the jurisdictions of the United States at least puts those who wish to
compel dispute resolution through some other mode in the position of
having to speak explicitly to that topic. Waivers of class-wide treat-
ment within contractual arbitration clauses are the result. To be sure,
there remains debate over the degree to which ordinary consumers
pay attention to standardized contract language of any sort. But at
least a waiver of aggregate procedure must say just that. A trans-
Atlantic world well short of any operational consensus, much less con-
vergence, on the basic parameters for aggregate litigation is a world in
which the game may be played sotto voce. Sellers of goods and services
in the global marketplace might seek to foreclose aggregation simply
by way of a clause that chooses the law, including the procedural law,
of the anomalous sovereign.
CONCLUSION
The usual account of U.S.-style civil litigation situates its prin-
cipal features, including the opt-out class action, as exceptional by
comparison to other Western industrialized democracies. The emer-
gence in Europe of procedures for aggregate litigation and moves to-
ward further reform in the same direction make for a modest lessen-
ing of American exceptionalism. Discussions of aggregation across the
Atlantic, however, should not confine themselves to mere positive cat-
aloguing of procedural differences.
To a degree, the tendency toward positive cataloguing reflects a
well-taken prudence to describe new developments in detail before
202. See Nagareda, supra note 199, at 1900 (discussing in this light a significant California
decision, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
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analyzing them. The same tendency also may reflect an inclination
toward the cataloguing of procedural doctrine as embodied in rules
and other authoritative sources-an enterprise that comprised the
bulk of litigation-related scholarship in the United States during the
1950s and 60s. One signal development in U.S. procedural scholarship
in more recent decades has been a broadening of the discussion by ref-
erence not simply to procedural doctrine, as found in rules and judicial
decisions, but also to the strategic and economic underpinnings of liti-
gation on the part of the real-world lawyers involved. In keeping with
this emerging genre of litigation scholarship, this Article has argued
for a broader analytical perspective, one that situates procedural dif-
ferences within the larger landscape of the structural dynamics that
they elicit from lawyers.
The scope of commerce, and thus the potential scope for dis-
putes in the aggregate, is increasingly global. A central challenge for
transnational aggregate litigation in the twenty-first century consists
of developing a working regime to regulate mismatches between the
preclusive scope of such lawsuits and the governing authority of the
rendering court. These regulatory mismatches are the global ana-
logues to phenomena familiar in nationwide class action litigation
within the United States during the late-twentieth century. The struc-
tural dynamics of these mismatches, not so much the specifics chosen
for aggregate procedure, represent the real story now playing out in
aggregate litigation across the Atlantic. What is likely to emerge is not
the exceptionalism of the U.S. experience but, instead, a striking lack
of exceptionalism-McDonald's on the Champs-Elysees, but with its
Quarter Pounder famously restyled as a Royale with Cheese. 203
203. See PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994).
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